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INTRODUCTION
The current interpretation of the written description
requirement annihilates thirty years of precedent.
This
significant departure from established procedure signals the
1
beginning of turmoil in obtaining biotechnology patents. The
new interpretation of the written description requirement
demonstrates the accelerated rate of development in the
2
American patent system. In this manner, the accelerated rate
of development of the written description requirement – from
its humble origins as a simple timing function to a heightened
enablement standard – exemplifies the increased sophistication
of this system. This study focuses upon the application of the
written description requirement to original claims in the patent
application.
This discussion employs the use of the term ‘modern’ to
refer to the era in written description law prior to the Federal

* Ms. Upadhyaya is an associate with Hovey Williams, L.L.P. in Kansas City,
Missouri. She is a member of the Patent Bar and Maryland Bar. Ms.
Upadhyaya has an LL.M. in Intellectual Property from George Washington
University Law School, a J.D. with honors from Drake University Law School,
and a B.S. in Chemistry from Rockhurst College.
1. The life of a patent attorney is a difficult one. In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d
990, 993 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (stating that the “life of a patent solicitor has always
been a hard one”).
2. See generally Randall R. Rader, Specialized Courts: The Legislative
Response, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1003 (1991); see also S. Jay Plager, The United
States Courts of Appeals, The Federal Circuit, and the Non-Regional Subject
Matter Concept: Reflections on the Search for a Model, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 853
(1990). These two articles discuss the evolution of the American court system
and the idea of specialized courts.
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Circuit’s combined holdings in Amgen v. Chugai, Fiers v.
4
5
Revel, and Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly.
These three cases, collectively referred to in this paper as the
trilogy of written description law, signal the beginning of the
‘postmodern’ era and demonstrate a departure from
conventional thought as discussed hereinafter.
The
postmodern era is characterized by its focus upon the adequacy
of written description for biotechnology inventions and presents
a grave departure from the modern era of written description
law. In other words, because of significant departures from
precedent, the Federal Circuit’s recent biotechnology written
description case law constitutes a shift in paradigm. The
postmodern written description law departs from modern case
law because it applies written description to original claims,
requires that a biotechnology invention be described
structurally, twists the possession test of written description,
and blurs the distinction between enablement and written
description.
This paper proposes to address each of these issues by
tracing the development of the written description
requirement. Part I of this paper presents a generalized
overview of biological technology. A general overview suffices
because specialized biotechnology inventions are discussed
thoroughly throughout this discussion in relevant case law.
Part II discusses the well-established precedent in the modern
written description era and examines the two major trends in
written description produced in the modern era. These trends
demonstrate that written description and enablement are
distinct requirements, and that written description is applied
exclusively to subsequently filed claims. Part III addresses the
important issue of the sufficiency of disclosure in meeting the
requirement.
Part IV describes the postmodern written
description requirement in detail, discusses the trilogy, and
provides an analytical explanation of the departure from
modern precedent. Part V discusses the new guidelines
implemented by the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO) in response to the postmodern trilogy. This
discussion concludes in Part VI that the postmodern written
description requirement in concert with the recent PTO

3. 927 F.2d 1200 (D. Mass. 1991).
4. 984 F.2d 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
5. 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1089 (1998).
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Guidelines will thwart progress in the biotechnological arts.
I. TECHNOLOGICAL BACKGROUND
The advent of recombinant DNA technology is possibly the
greatest contribution to humankind.
Herein humankind
possesses the potential to treat genetic diseases, cure and treat
illnesses in a more efficient manner, and ultimately discover
why individuals suffer from disease. Perhaps the key to
understanding life lies in the unraveling of the DNA molecule.
DNA is the fundamental unit of life. DNA “carries
information about the color of our eyes and hair, about our
stature, the form of our nose, whether or not we will be a
6
virtuoso musician, and many other things.” The role of DNA
in protein synthesis provides a background for our basic lesson
in biology.
Many of the patent applications in the
biotechnology arts relate to specific proteins and the method of
7
Amino acids are the building blocks of
producing them.
8
proteins. The amino acid sequence of a protein determines
9
both its structural and functional characteristics.
10
DNA is a right-handed double helix comprised of four
11
nucleotides: adenine, guanine, cytosine, and thymine.
A
nucleotide consists of a nitrogenous ring attached to a pentose
12
sugar that has a phosphate group attached to it. A nucleotide
13
sequence determines the amino acid sequence of a protein.
14
Protein synthesis occurs in two stages.
First, an enzyme,
ribonucleic acid (RNA) polymerase, recognizes the promoter

6. MAXIM D. FRANK-KAMENETSKII, UNRAVELING DNA: THE MOST
IMPORTANT MOLECULE OF LIFE 27 (1997).
7. See In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 896 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (stating that
many “valuable proteins occur in nature only in minute quantities, or are
difficult to purify from natural sources.
Therefore, a goal of many
biotechnology projects. . . is to devise methods to synthesize useful quantities
of specific proteins by controlling the mechanism by which living cells make
proteins”).
8. See id. There are twenty naturally occurring amino acids: alanine,
valine, leucine, isoleucine, proline, phenylalanine, methionine, tryptophan,
glycine, asparagine, glutamine, cysteine, serine, threonine, tyrosine, aspartic
acid, glutamic acid, lysine, arginine, and histidine. See id. at 896 n.2.
9. See id. at 896.
10. See id. at 896 n.5.
11. See id. at 896.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See FRANK-KAMENETSKII, supra note 6, at 19.
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sequence of DNA and begins the process of transcription.
Transcription is the copying of the double-stranded DNA into a
16
single-stranded mRNA molecule.
RNA and DNA are
structurally similar. Both molecules are composed of four
nucleotides, but the RNA molecule contains uridine instead of
17
The second stage of protein
the thymidine found in DNA.
synthesis begins when the transcribed mRNA molecule
18
undergoes translation.
Translation is the conversion of the information contained
19
in the mRNA molecule into amino acid sequences.
This
conversion occurs by reading codons corresponding to a
20
particular amino acid. Codons are sets of three nucleotides,
which contain the specific genetic code for a particular amino
21
acid. “The four bases [adenine, guanine, cytosine, and uracil]
can be combined as triplets in 64 different ways, but there are
22
only 20 amino acids to be coded.” For this reason, more than
23
one codon can signal the production of an amino acid. This is
24
known as the rule of degeneracy of the genetic code.
The
mRNA molecule functions as a carrier of genetic information,
transcribed from DNA, to the ribosomes, where the information
25
is then translated into the amino acid sequence of proteins.
Recombinant DNA technology operates to produce selected
26
proteins using cloning techniques.
Generally, this is done
through transferring DNA sequences from eukaryotic cells into
27
Prokaryotic cells are valuable in this
prokaryotic cells.
process because they are inexpensive and can be grown in mass
28
The DNA sequence of the eukaryotic cell is
quantities.
isolated and cloned and then introduced into the prokaryotic

15. See id.
16. See O’Farrell, 853 F.2d at 897.
17. See FRANK-KAMENETSKII, supra note 6, at 19.
18. See id.
19. See O’Farrell, 853 F.2d at 897.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. Id.
23. See id.
24. See Scott A. Chambers, Comments on the Patentability of Certain
Inventions Associated with the Identification of Partial cDNA Sequences, 23
AIPLA Q. J. 53, 58 (1995).
25. See O’Farrell, 853 F.2d at 898.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See id.
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29

cell.
The eukaryotic sequence is introduced into the
prokaryotic cell by introducing the sequence into a cloning
30
vector. The cloning vector is a DNA sequence that replicates
31
itself when introduced into the prokaryotic host.
The general overview of the biological science presented
above is basic because the increased sophistication of the
methodologies used in biotechnology inventions is described
hereafter in the relevant case law. However, this overview is a
necessary precursor to understanding the fundamental
operation of the most important science of life concomitant with
the application of the writing requirement to patent these great
achievements.
II. THE MODERN WRITTEN DESCRIPTION
REQUIREMENT
A written description requirement has been a part of
32
American patent law since the first patent statute in 1790.
The Patent Act of 1790 required the patentee to provide
a specification in writing, containing a description . . . of the thing or
things by him . . . invented or discovered . . . which specification shall
be so particular, . . . as not only to distinguish the invention or
discovery from other things before known and used, but also to enable
a workman or other person skilled in the art . . . to make, construct or
use the same, to the end that the public may have the full benefit
33
thereof, after the expiration of the patent term . . . .

Section 112, paragraph 1, of the Patent Act of 1952 derives its
34
language from § 6 of the Patent Act of 1836.
Section 112,
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id. at 899.
32. See Janice C. Mueller, The Evolving Application of the Written
Description Requirement to Biotechnological Inventions, 13 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 615, 618 (1998) (stating that all “United States patent statutes have
required a ‘description’ of the applicant’s invention”); see also Zhibin Ren,
Confusing Reasoning, Right Result: The Written Description Requirement and
Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Company, 1999 WIS. L.
REV. 1297, 1301 (1999). According to Ren, “[s]ince the first United States
patent statute was enacted in 1790, the requirement for a written description
of the invention has been embedded in the statutory language.” Id. See also
In re Barker, 559 F.2d 588, 592 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (“Commencing with our first
patent statute, there have been separate requirements for a description of the
invention and a description of how to make and use it.”).
33. Mueller, supra note 32, at 618 (quoting the Patent Act of 1790, § 2).
34. See Ren, supra note 32, at 1301; see also Barker, 559 F.2d at 593
(“Essentially the same language has been carried over into the present
statute”).
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paragraph 1, states that the
specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and
of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full clear,
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to
which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make
and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by
35
the inventor of carrying out his invention.

Prior to the enactment of the Patent Act of 1870, which
36
mandated the inclusion of a claim, the written description
37
requirement served to delineate the scope of the invention.
The advent of peripheral claiming obviated the need to impose
a written description requirement until its revival by the Court
38
of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) in 1967.
The early statutory interpretations of the written
description requirement initially focused upon determining the
role played by the requirement in the patent law scheme. Prior
to the enactment of the Patent Act of 1952, the written
39
description requirement essentially served a “notice” function.
The postmodern written description requirement is simply its
predecessor’s shadow, haunting patent applicants in the
biotechnology arts. The modern view considered the written
40
description requirement “relatively simple to comply with.”
However, the written description requirement has progressed a
long way from a simple requirement to a gargantuan
undertaking.
Two crucial breakthroughs are relevant to
35. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 (2000).
36. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 379 (1996)
(stating that claim “practice did not achieve statutory recognition until the
passage of the Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 119, and inclusion of a
claim did not become a statutory requirement until 1870, Act of July 8, 1870,
ch. 230, § 26, 16 Stat. 1201. . . .”). The modern claiming requirement made the
Supreme Court’s Seventh Amendment inquiry more difficult. See id. at 379.
37. See Ren, supra note 32, at 1301; Mueller, supra note 32, at 619-20
(“Absent claims as we know them today, the written description provided
notice to the public of the scope of exclusive rights asserted by an inventor”).
38. See Ren, supra note 32, at 1301; Mueller, supra note 32, at 620
After the development of claims, first expressly required in the Patent
Act of 1870, the “written description” requirement took on a different
role. No longer necessary to provide notice to the public of the
asserted scope of the patentee’s right to exclude, the “written
description” language of section 112 of the Patent Act became a
historical anachronism without a role in the statutory scheme.
Id.
39. See Mueller, supra note 32, at 618-20.
40. Harris A. Pitlick, The Mutation on the Description Requirement Gene,
80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 209, 210 (1998) (quoting In re Moore, 439
F.2d 1232 (C.C.P.A. 1971)).
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understanding the development of the postmodern written
description requirement.
The first major breakthrough
occurred in the context of whether written description was
separate and distinct from enablement. In reviewing early case
law, another more crucial trend is clear. The early trend in
applying written description to patent applications consisted
primarily of its application to claims added subsequent to the
original application. This trend presents the background for
discussion of the second major breakthrough in written
description jurisprudence; that is, the application of the written
description requirement to claims originally filed in the patent
application.
A. WRITTEN DESCRIPTION IS SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM
ENABLEMENT
Written description is an independent legal criterion in
41
modern patent law.
In 1822, the Supreme Court provided
interpretation of the written description requirement as
42
codified in the Patent Act of 1793. Evans v. Eaton concerned
43
the validity of the “hopperboy” patent.
Justice Story
identified two major objectives in the specification requirement
44
of the Patent Act of 1793. First, the specification guaranteed
that the invention was enabled so that the public could derive
45
the full benefit of the disclosed invention. Additionally, the
specification acted
to put the public in possession of what the party claims as his own
invention, so as to ascertain if he claim any thing that is in common
use, or is already known, and to guard against prejudice or injury

41. See Ren, supra note 32, at 1301.
42. See Mueller, supra note 32, at 619 (discussing Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S.
356, 430 (1822)). The Patent Act of 1793 required an inventor to
deliver a written description of his invention, and of the manner of
using, or process of compounding the same, in such full, clear, and
exact terms, as to distinguish the same from all things before known,
and to enable any person skilled in the art or science, of which it is a
branch, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make,
compound, and use the same; and in the case of any machine, he shall
fully explain the several modes in which he has contemplated the
application of the principle, or character by which it may be
distinguished from other inventions.
Evans, 20 U.S. at 430 (discussing the Patent Act of 1793).
43. See Evans, 20 U.S. at 424; see also Mueller, supra note 32, at 618-19
(the “hopperboy” was “a mechanical device used to stir and cool flour prior to
its packaging”).
44. See Evans, 20 U.S. at 433-34.
45. See id.
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from the use of an invention which the party may otherwise
46
innocently suppose not to be patented.

The written description requirement provided notice to the
public of the scope of the invention, and duly limited the
patentee’s right to enforce a patent beyond the metes and
47
bounds of the description provided in the specification. Thus,
the Evans decision maintained a distinction between an
48
enablement and a written description.
The Evans decision construing the Patent Act of 1793
presents no great leap in theory from the modern written
49
Evans maintained that written
description case law.
description was a distinct and separate requirement under the
50
Patent Act of 1793. This holds true for the written description
requirement under the Patent Act of 1952 as well.
Furthermore, Evans recited that the written description
requirement served to place the public “in possession” of the
51
invention. The possession test is used in the modern era as
well, but with a twist. Modern written description inquiry
focuses upon whether the inventor had possession at the time
of filing, not whether the public was put in possession of the
invention. The twist originated from the requirement that a
claim must be included in the specification. The claim element
puts the public on notice of the metes and bounds of the
invention. Case law has shifted the function of written
description requirement from one of mere notice to
52
indispensable support for the patent claim .
The development of the written description requirement as
an independent criterion of patentability, under the Patent Act
of 1952, was solidified in 1967. In 1967, the CCPA rendered its
53
Judge Rich aptly provided the
decision in In re Ruschig.

46. Id. at 434.
47. See id. at 434-35; see also Mueller, supra note 32, at 620 (stating that
“the public was to be ‘put in possession’ of the boundaries of a patentee’s
asserted monopoly”).
48. See Evans, 20 U.S. at 433-34.
49. See id. at 434-35.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See Mueller, supra note 32, at 621 (describing the shift from the notice
function to the support function). “[T]he CCPA effectively transitioned the
written description requirement from a superfluous, claim-like notice role into
a convenient statutory descriptor for the general concept of ‘support’ for claims
not filed in an original application.” Id.
53. See In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
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following analogy:
It is an old custom in the woods to mark trails by making blaze marks
on the trees. It is no help in finding a trail or in finding one’s way
through the woods where the trails have disappeared – or have not
yet been made, which is more like the case here – to be confronted
simply by a large number of unmarked trees. Appellants are pointing
to trees. We are looking for blaze marks which single out particular
54
trees. We see none.

The written description issue in Ruschig arose in the context of
a claim added in order to provoke an interference one year after
55
the filing date of the original application. The CCPA did not
hesitate to assert the independence of the written description
56
requirement from the enablement requirement. In fact, Judge
Rich dismissed the inventor’s arguments relating to the
adequacy of the enabling disclosure to one of skill in the art as
57
“beside the point.”
The opinion concedes the enablement
requirement was satisfied, but the primary issue on appeal was
“not whether [the person skilled in the art] would be so enabled
but whether the specification disclose[d] the [invention] . . . as
58
This
something [the inventor] actually invented.”
characterization of the proper basis of the rejection presented a
shift in written description law, and a new trail was blazed.
The written description requirement served as a support
59
function for the newly added claims. The written description
requirement after Ruschig prevents a patentee from claiming
an earlier filing date for the invention if it was not sufficiently
60
disclosed at the time of the original application date.
Ruschig was not an isolated decision. The 1977 In re
61
Barker decision completes this discussion. The invention
claimed was a method of making prefabricated panels of
62
The sole claim on appeal was added by
wooden shingles.
amendment and was directed to the method of making the
63
panels. Three bases of rejections were directed to the newly
added claim—enablement, written description, and new

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 994-95.
See id. at 991.
See id. at 995-96.
See id. at 995.
Id.
See Mueller, supra note 32, at 621.
See Ren, supra note 32, at 1302.
In re Barker, 599 F.2d 588 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
See id. at 589.
See id. at 590.
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64

matter.
The CCPA rejected the argument that the
enablement requirement could not be read separately from the
65
written description requirement. The CCPA statement that
“[a] specification may contain a disclosure that is sufficient to
enable one skilled in the art to make and use the invention and
yet fail to comply with the description of the invention
66
requirement,” recognized that an invention may satisfy the
enablement requirement without satisfying the written
description requirement. Accordingly, the court
reaffirm[ed] [the] recognition that 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph,
contains separate requirements for a written description (1) of the
invention, and (2) of the manner and process of making and using it,
in such full clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person
67
skilled in the art . . . to make and use the same.”

The Federal Circuit has also conclusively stated that § 112,
first paragraph, requires a written description requirement
separate and distinct from the enablement requirement in Vas68
Cath v. Mahurkar.
The court stated that the purpose of
written description was “broader than to merely explain how to
‘make and use’; the applicant must also convey with reasonable
clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date
69
The
sought, he or she was in possession of the invention.”
court finally came full circle to the modified possession test
articulated in Evans and put to rest any doubt that enablement
70
and written description were one and the same entity.
Although the holdings of the historic Evans decision and
the modern Ruschig, Barker, and Vas-Cath decisions are
essentially the same, i.e. written description is a separate and
distinct requirement from enablement, the cases differ in the
underlying determinations as to what function written
71
description serves. While written description initially placed
64. See id. at 591.
65. See id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 593. In footnote 6 of the Barker decision, the CCPA stated “the
patent code does not prescribe a different standard between ‘complex’ and
‘simple’ cases; nor does this court apply different standards in such cases.” Id.
at 593 n.6.
68. Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
69. Id. at 1563-64 (emphasis in original).
70. See id. at 1561 (quoting the possession test of Evans v. Eaton).
71. See Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1563; see also In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990,
995 (C.C.P.A. 1967); Barker, 599 F.2d at 591; Ren, supra note 32, at 1302.
These cases support the conclusion that written description and enablement
address different concerns; otherwise, they would be redundant facets of the
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the public in possession of the invention consonant with the
basic quid pro quo of the American patent regime, peripheral
72
claiming caused a shift in written description thought. The
function of written description is to ensure that the inventor
had actually invented what she claims in the patent
73
application. In other words, the inventor must “convey with
reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the
filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the
74
invention.”
B. WRITTEN DESCRIPTION MUST PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR
SUBSEQUENTLY FILED CLAIMS.
A discussion of early case law illustrates the manner in
which the written description law was applied. For a variety of
reasons, courts consistently drew a distinction between claims
originally filed in the patent application and claims added
75
This distinction solidified the strong correlation
later.
between the written description requirement and the support
function discussed above.
The consonance between the
identified function of written description and the application
served the practical purpose of ensuring that the inventor’s
invention date was actually warranted by the disclosure
76
provided in the specification.
Determination of the proper date of invention is imperative
in patent law. Any novelty and nonobviousness analysis
depends upon the proper determination of the date of invention
77
in order to compare the patent application with the prior art.
The prima facie date of invention is the filing date of the patent
78
application.
Application of the written description
same patent law scheme.
72. See Ren, supra note 32, at 1301-02.
73. See id. at 1302. This function makes sense because the inventor
should not remove material already in the public domain.
74. Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1563-64 (emphasis in original).
75. Most of the cases discussed herein applied written description to
subsequently filed claims.
76. See Mueller, supra note 32, at 615.
77. See id 621-22; see also Mark J. Stewart, The Written Description
Requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112(1): The Standard After Regents of the
University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 32 IND. L. REV. 537, 545-46 (1999).
(“The filing date can be critical especially in the rapidly progressing and
highly competitive biotechnology industry. The filing date is the prima facie
date of the invention for determining novelty, priority, and nonobviousness.
In addition, the date is critical for determining statutory bar provisions”).
78. See Mueller, supra note 32, at 621-22; see also In re Smith, 481 F.2d
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requirement to subsequently added claims proceeded on the
basis that the inventor would receive a “windfall vis a vis the
79
prior art” if she were permitted to add claims to an earlier
80
filed application without support for the new claims.
The
prior art applicable to any particular invention as claimed in a
patent application is dependent upon the adequate disclosure
provided in the original application for subsequently filed
claims. If the inventor had not provided adequate support,
then, absent the written description requirement, the inventor
would be able to infinitely add claims to the application after
making further developments on the invention.
Any
intervening prior art, invented between the date of the
patented invention and the date that new claims were added,
could easily be sidestepped. In effect, an inventor could obtain
a great windfall by removing intervening prior art and
gradually increase the scope of the claimed invention as new
modifications, derivations, or improvements were made to the
81
invention as originally filed. The following discussion of the
case law demonstrates the role of the written description
requirement as applied to claims filed after the original
application.
82
In In re Smith, the CCPA acknowledged that recognition
of the independence of the written description requirement
“evidences appreciation of an important purpose of § 112, first
paragraph, which is the definition of the attributes which a
patent specification must possess as of the filing date to be
83
entitled to that filing date as a prima facie date of invention.”
The written description requirement ensured that the “subject
matter presented in the form of a claim subsequent to the filing
date of the application was sufficiently disclosed at the time of
filing so that the prima facie date of invention can fairly be held
84
to be the filing date of the application.” The CCPA further
stated that the concept of ensuring that subsequently added
claims were entitled to the benefit of the filing date applied in
situations where
the case factually arises out of an assertion of entitlement to the filing

910, 914 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
79. Mueller, supra note 32, at 622.
80. See id. at 621-22.
81. See id.
82. In re Smith, 481 F.2d 910 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
83. Id. at 914.
84. Id.
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date of a previously filed application under § 120, . . . or arises in the
interference context wherein the issue is support for a count in the
specification of one or more of the parties, . . . or arises in an ex parte
case involving a single application, but where the claim at issue was
85
filed subsequent to the filing of the application.

The Smith court drew a sharp distinction between original
claims and claims that were added subsequent to the original
86
The definitive portion in the Smith decision
filing date.
explains that “[w]here the claim is an original claim, the
underlying concept of insuring disclosure as of the filing date is
satisfied, and the description requirement has likewise been
87
In the case of original claims, the
held to be satisfied.”
written description requirement was necessarily satisfied
because the underlying concept of disclosure as of the filing
88
By necessity, originally filed claims
date was satisfied.
fulfilled written description because they disclosed the requisite
information needed for the earlier date of invention. The
original claims constituted part of the original disclosure.
Obviously, the claim at issue in Smith was not an originally
89
filed claim in the application.
A few months prior to the Smith decision, the CCPA had
90
considered In re Gardner.
The invention in Gardner was
directed to a class of guanidinoalkyl—1:4-benzodioxan
91
The
compounds useful as antihypertensive agents.
92
application was a continuation-in-part application. The only
claim presented to the CCPA on appeal was Claim 2, which
covered “a total of 17 compounds and in fact delineate[d] a
subgenus of the broad class of guanidinoalkyl—1:4-benzodioxan
93
derivatives disclosed in the application.” Of the five possible
substituents, only three were specified and were limited to the
94
The solicitor had
seventh position of the benzodioxan ring.
argued that a § 112 written description rejection was proper
because the specification contained no language corresponding

85. Id. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
86. See id.
87. Id.
88. See id.
89. See id. at 912.
90. In re Gardner, 475 F.2d 1389 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
91. See id. at 1390.
92. See id. at 1390 n.1 (“A continuation-in-part of serial No. 251, 471, filed
January 15, 1968, now U.S. 3,360,529”).
93. Id. at 1391.
94. See id.
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95

to the subgenus defined in the claim.
The Gardner court
grounded its decision that the written description requirement
was satisfied on the fact that Claim 2 was an original claim in
the patent application stating:
Claim 2, which apparently was an original claim, in itself constituted
a description in the original disclosure equivalent in scope and
identical in language to the total subject matter now being claimed.
Nothing more is necessary for compliance with the description
96
requirement of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112.
97

The 1971 In re Dileone decision further illustrates the
sharp distinction between original claims and subsequently
added claims. The Dileone court, in determining whether the
written description requirement was satisfied for subsequent
claims, looked to the original claims as part of the specification
for support, stating “[a]ppellant has failed to bring to our
attention anything in the specification, including the claims as
originally filed, which would broaden his description of
polyimides by removing the requirement that there be a
plurality of units of the basic structure joined directly
98
together.”
One of the best examples of the application of the written
99
description requirement is found in In re Wertheim.
The
100
invention was for a process of making freeze dried coffee. The
95. See id.
96. Id.
97. In re Dileone, 436 F.2d 1033 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
98. Id. at 1034 (emphasis added).
99. In re Wertheim, 541 F.2d 257 (C.C.P.A. 1976).
100. See id. at 258. The claims illustrative of the process are as follows:
1. An improved process for minimizing loss of volatiles during freezedrying of coffee extract which comprises obtaining coffee extract,
concentrating said extract to a higher solids level of at least 35%,
foaming said concentrated extract to a substantial overrun by
injection of a gas into said extract at at least atmospheric pressure to
thereby avoid evaporative cooling due to evaporation of water in said
extract during said foaming, freezing said foam to below its eutectic
point at at least atmospheric pressure while avoiding evaporative
cooling, and freeze-drying said extract at below the eutectic
temperature of said extract.
6. Process for preparing a powdered coffee extract, which comprises
adding sufficient inert gas to a concentrated aqueous extract of roast
coffee containing about 25% to 60% by weight of soluble coffee solids
to provide a foam having a density between about 0.4 and 0.8 gm/cc,
freezing the foamed extract to a solid mass, grinding the frozen foam
to a particle size of at least 0.25 mm and freeze drying the ground
frozen foam.
30. An apparatus for carrying out the process defined in claim 6
comprising, in combination, means for foaming, a closed chamber
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original application contained claims 1 through 5 copied from
101
the Pfluger patent in order to provoke an interference.
Claims 6 through 35 were transferred by amendment from a
102
1966 parent application.
The application also contained
claims 36 through 39, which depended from claim 2 in order to
103
The court
provide phantom counts in the interference.
divided the claims on appeal into interference claims and non104
The interference claims on appeal,
interference claims.
claims 1, 2, 4, 37, and 38, provided the basis for the court’s
105
“The
analysis of the written description requirement.
dispositive issue . . . [was] whether appellant’s parent and
Swiss applications compl[ied] with 35 U.S.C. § 112, first
paragraph, including the description requirement, as to the
106
The central concern was
subject matter of these claims.”
whether the invention as claimed was entitled to the benefit of
the earlier filing dates of the parent and foreign application in
order to entitle the inventor to an earlier date of invention in
107
The
an interference proceeding against the Pfluger patent.
relevant inquiry became whether the Swiss application
complied with the written description requirement because the
benefit of the Swiss application was needed in order to antedate
108
the Pfluger patent.
The CCPA stated that the written description requirement
functioned to ensure possession by the inventor as of the filing
109
Although the court focused upon the adequacy of the
date.
written description in the Swiss application in determining the
proper filing date, the court distinguished original claims in the
capable of being maintained at a temperature which is substantially
below the melting temperature of said frozen foam, and, disposed
within said chamber, a movable endless belt, means for moving said
belt at a low speed, a spreading device for distributing coffee extract
foam on said belt and refrigerating means for cooling at least one
surface of said belt with a liquid refrigerant.
40. A dry coffee powder comprising a freeze-dried particulated foamed
extract of roast and ground coffee, the foam before freeze drying
having a density between about 0.4 and 0.8 gm/cc.
Id. at 258-59.
101. See id. at 259.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See id. at 261-62.
106. Id. at 261.
107. See id. at 262.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 262.
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appealed application. For example, in response to an argument
by appellants that amendments made in the appealed
application showed that the relevant knowledge of one skilled
in the art warranted a finding that certain temperatures were
within the conventional wisdom and required no more than an
inherent disclosure, the court remarked that the “amendment
is clearly irrelevant since claim 4, an originally filed claim, is
110
its own written description in the appealed application.”
Because the court was determining satisfaction of written
description in the Swiss application and not in the appealed
application, the rejection of claim 4 was proper under § 112,
paragraph 1.
Smith, Gardner, DiLeone, and Wertheim demonstrate the
consistent application of the written description requirement
111
The exclusive
exclusively to subsequently filed claims.
application of the written description requirement to
subsequently filed claims establishes that written description
functioned to ensure that the inventor was entitled to the
original filing date. Original claims necessarily fulfill this
112
function as they constitute part of the original disclosure.
Courts justifiably applied the written description requirement
113
to claims filed subsequent to the original filing date.
As long
as the inventor had demonstrated that she had possession of
the subsequently filed claims at the time of the original filing
date, the manner in which the inventor chose to comply with
114
the written description requirement was irrelevant.

110. Id. at 264.
111. See In re Smith, 481 F.2d 910, 914 (C.C.P.A. 1971); In re Gardner, 475
F.2d 1389, 1391 (C.C.P.A. 1973); In re Dileone, 436 F.2d 1033, 1033 (C.C.P.A.
1971); Wertheim, 541 F.2d at 264. Each of these cases stands for the
proposition that the original claims in a patent application inherently fulfill
the written description requirement.
112. See Pitlick, supra note 40, at 210 (“So long as claimed subject matter
was either originally claimed or found the same or synonymous language in
the specification whose filing date is sought, the possession test, and hence the
description requirement, has traditionally been held to be satisfied.”)
(emphasis in original).
113. See Wertheim, 541 F.2d at 262. This is a justifiable application
because the function of the written description requirement was to ensure
possession by the inventor as of the filing date.
114. See Smith, 481 F.2d at 914; Gardner, 475 F.2d at 1391; Dileone, 436
F.2d at 1033; Wertheim, 541 F.2d at 264. The decisions discussed thus far
focus attention upon whether the inventor disclosed the material claimed in
the disclosure. As long as some indication of possession was provided, the
written description requirement was satisfied.
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III.THE MANNER OF SATISFYING THE WRITTEN
DESCRIPTION REQUIREMENT.
Case law repetitively stated that “[t]he function of the
description requirement is to ensure that the inventor had
possession, as of the filing date of the application relied on, of
the specific subject matter later claimed by him; how the
115
As long as
specification accomplishes this is not material.”
the inventor could demonstrate that she had possession of the
invention, the manner in which the invention was described
116
117
Written description is a question of fact.
was irrelevant.
The relevant assessment of the adequacy of written description
118
is determined by reference to one of ordinary skill in the art.
This person of ordinary skill in the art could be the same
individual, hypothetically, for written description purposes as
119
But the written description and
for enablement purposes.
120
enablement inquiries are worlds apart.
Enablement is an
objective assessment that asks whether the specification
teaches one of ordinary skill in the art to make and use the
121
In
claimed invention without undue experimentation.
115. Wertheim, 541 F.2d at 262. “The specification as originally filed must
convey clearly to those skilled in the art the information that the applicant has
invented the specific subject matter later claimed. When the original
specification accomplishes that, regardless of how it accomplishes it, the
essential goal of the description requirement is realized.” In re Wright, 866
F.2d 422, 424 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (emphasis in original).
116. See Wertheim, 541 F.2d at 262.
117. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566
(Fed. Cir. 1997).
118. See Mueller, supra note 32, at 622.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See id. at 622-23.
Examination for enablement inquires whether those of ordinary skill
would have been able to make and use the claimed invention without
undue experimentation, based on the teachings of the application.
This standard is a completely objective one; the “intent” or subjective
view of the inventor is not relevant in determining whether the level
of enabling disclosure is reasonably commensurate with the scope of
the claims. Written description compliance, however, is neither
completely objective nor subjective.
It entails a “mixed”
determination, from the perspective of the person of ordinary skill, of
what the inventor actually “possessed” as her invention on a
particular date. The inventor’s “possession” of the invention must be
reasonably manifested or conveyed by her patent specification, which
includes the written description, any drawings, and originally-filed
claims. The patent specification must some how show persons of
ordinary skill that, at the time the application was filed, the laterclaimed subject matter was something the applicant had invented.
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contrast, the written description inquiry is a mixed subjectiveobjective inquiry that demands a determination of whether one
of ordinary skill in the art would be informed that the inventor
had possession of the claimed invention at the time of filing the
122
patent application.
An inventor can indisputably describe her invention by
function rather than by structure as long as the description
conveys possession of the invention actually invented as of the
123
The claimed
filing date to one of ordinary skill in the art.
invention in In re Hayes disclosed an improved mechanism for
124
Each of the
detecting an escape command by a modem.
125
claims at issue included “timing means.”
The accused
infringer, Ven-Tel, asserted that the “timing means” referred to
a software timer, the structure of which was not disclosed in
126
The Federal Circuit held that “[d]isclosing
the specification.
a microprocessor capable of performing certain functions is
sufficient to satisfy the requirement of section 112, first
paragraph, when one skilled in the relevant art would
127
understand what is intended and know how to carry it out.”
The court held that “timing means” sufficiently recited the
function of the firmware, and that one of skill in the art would
know how to implement the timing means in a microprocessor
128
without the firmware listing.
The CCPA provided reasoning for permitting an inventor
to describe her invention by function rather than structure in
129
In re Smythe.
The court held that requiring the applicant to

Id.
122. See id at 626.
123. See In re Hayes Microcomputer Prods., 982 F.2d 1527, 1534 (Fed. Cir.
1992); see also Mueller, supra note 32, at 626 (“An inventor may convey what
he has invented by describing its function rather than its structure, so long as
the functional description adequately conveys that the inventor was legally in
possession of the invention as of the asserted filing date.”).
124. See Hayes Microcomputer Prods., 982 F.2d at 1531.
125. Id.
126. See id. at 1533.
127. Id. at 1534. “The evidence of record supports the conclusion that all
that was required for one of ordinary skill in the art to understand what the
invention was and how to carry it out was the disclosure of a microprocessor
having certain capabilities and the desired functions it was to perform.” Id. at
1534.
128. See id.
129. In re Smythe, 480 F.2d 1376 (C.C.P.A. 1973). The court provided the
following hypothetical:
If the original specification of a patent application on the scales of
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describe her invention structurally would place
the undue burden of listing, in the case of applicants, reading and
examining, in the case of the Patent Office, and printing and storing,
in the case of the public, descriptions of the very many structural or
functional equivalents of disclosed elements or steps which are
already stored in the minds of those skilled in the arts, ready for
instant recall upon reading the descriptions of specific elements or
130
steps.

Allowing an applicant to describe the invention functionally
provided the most efficient use of resources, and Hayes properly
recognized the Smythe reasoning in permitting a functional
description of the invention. An applicant was given leeway in
providing an adequate description of the invention because the
primary concern was possession, not the manner in which
131
The proper inquiry has always
possession was established.
been whether the inventor had established possession of the
132
For example, in
invention to one of ordinary skill in the art.
133
In re Moore, the CCPA stated that “the ‘description of the
invention’. . . [requirement], [is] relatively simple to comply
with and thus will ordinarily demand minimal concern on the
134
The invention claimed fluorinated
part of the Patent Office.”
135
alkyladamantanes prepared by a particular process.
The
CCPA couched its opinion primarily on § 112, paragraph 2
indefiniteness and dismissed the contention that the
application lacked adequate written description for the
justice disclosed only a 1-pound “lead weight” as a counterbalance to
determine the weight of a pound of flesh, we do not believe the
applicant should be prevented, by the so-called “description
requirement” of the first paragraph of § 112, or the prohibition
against new matter of § 132, from later claiming the counterbalance
as a “metal weight” or simply as a 1-pound “weight,” although both
“metal weight” and “weight” would indeed be progressively broader
than “lead weight,” including even such an undisclosed, but obviously
art-recognized equivalent, “weight” as a pound of feathers. The
broader claim language would be permitted because the description of
the use and function of the lead weight as a scale counterbalance in
the whole disclosure would immediately convey to any person skilled
in the art the knowledge that the applicant invented a scale with a 1pound counterbalance weight, regardless of its composition.
Id. at 1384 (emphasis in original).
130. Id.
131. See Hayes Microcomputer Prods., 982 F.2d at 1534; see also Smythe,
480 F.2d at 1376.
132. See Hayes Microcomputer Prods., 982 F.2d at 1534; see also Smythe,
480 F.2d at 1376.
133. In re Moore, 439 F.2d 1232 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
134. Id. at 1236.
135. See id. at 1233.
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136

products by defining the process.
Inherent functions of inventions would also satisfy the
137
written description requirement. In In re Reynolds, claims
138
15-18 were initially rejected by the Patent Office Board of
139
Appeals for lack of support under § 112, paragraph 1.
The
claims were copied from the Schatter patent for the purpose of
140
The specification contained no
provoking an interference.
express reference to either the structure preventing abrupt
changes in capitance when the auxiliary parts moved from a
confronting relationship with the stationary plates or to the
141
In asserting the adequacy of
function recited in the claim.
the disclosure, the applicant referred to a drawing alleging that
the structure identified in the drawing would inherently
142
The court, referring to the
perform the stated function.
drawing’s recitation of “geometric certainty,” concluded that
“[b]y disclosing in a patent application a device that inherently
performs a function, operates according to a theory, or has an
advantage, a patent applicant necessarily discloses that
function, theory or advantage even though he says nothing
143
concerning it.” The court found that the application supported

136. See id. at 1236.
137. In re Reynolds, 443 F.2d 384 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
138. Claim 15 is representative of the limitation considered by the court. It
reads as follows:
15. A variable capacitor comprising two cooperating capacitor plates
mounted for movement with respect to each other between a first
position wherein the capitance of the capacitor is at a minimum and a
second position wherein the capitance of the capacitor is at a
maximum, one of said capacitor plates having a main part and an
auxiliary part, only said auxiliary part of said one capacitor plate
being opposite the other of said capacitor plates when the capacitor is
in said first position thereof, said auxiliary part of said one capacitor
plate being adjustable toward and away from said other capacitor
plate, thereby to allow the minimum capacitance of the capacitor to be
adjusted, said auxiliary part of said one capacitor plate being not
opposite said other capacitor plate when the capacitor is in its second
position, said capacitor further comprising means for preventing an
abrupt change in the capacitance characteristic of the capacitor at the
point where said auxiliary part of said one capacitor plate ceases to be
opposite said other capacitor plate.
Id. at 387-88.
139. See id. at 387-88.
140. See id. at 388.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. Id. at 389 (quoting Technicon Instruments Corp. v. Cole Instruments,
Inc., 255 F. Supp. 630, 640-41 (N.D. Ill. 1966).
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144

the interference claims, and reversed the board’s decision.
Similarly, in Kennecott Corp. v. Kyocera International,
145
Inc., an inherent functional disclosure in a parent application
was sufficient to provide support for claims in a continuation146
The written description issue arose in
in-part application.
147
the context of a § 102(b) “on sale” bar determination.
The
patent issued from a continuation-in-part application filed in
148
The on-sale
1978 from a parent application filed in 1975.
activity occurred one year before the filing of the continuation149
In order to overcome the § 102(b)
in-part application.
invalidity determination, Kennecott attempted to claim the
150
benefit of the earlier filing date of the parent application.
Although the continuation-in-part application and the parent
application contained substantial similarity in the description
provided, the parent application contained no reference to
“equiaxed microstructure” found in the continuation-in-part
151
Kennecott asserted that although the “equiaxed
application.
microstructure” was not disclosed in the parent application, the
“equiaxed microstructure” was inherent in the structure
152
produced in the parent application.
The court reasoned that “express description of the
inherent property, since not ‘new matter’, [sic] could be added
153
to the specification with effect as of the original filing date.”
In allowing the addition of an inherent property not contained
in the parent application, the court referred to chemical case
154
law allowing for such inherent disclosures. The court cited In
155
re Edwards, which considered “a chemical compound that
was not described in the earlier application, and stated that the
144. See id.
145. Kennecott Corp. v. Kyocera Int’l, Inc., 835 F.2d 1419 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
146. See id. at 1421 (stating “[t]he incorporation of the requirements of §
112 into § 120 ensures that the inventor had possession of the later-claimed
invention on the filing date of the earlier application.”).
147. Id. at 1419; see 35 U.S.C § 102(b) (1994) (stating that a person is not
entitled to a patent if the invention was on sale in the United States for a year
prior to the patent application).
148. See Kennecott, 835 F.2d at 1419.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. Id. at 1420.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1422 (analogizing to In re Reynolds, 443 F.2d 384, 389 (C.C.P.A.
1971)).
154. See id.
155. In re Edwards, 568 F.2d 1349 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
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earlier and later applications need not use the identical words,
if the earlier application shows the subject matter that is
claimed in the later application, with adequate direction as to
156
how to obtain it.”
The Edwards invention claimed a water-insoluable polyol
able to react with organic polyisocyanates to form rigid
polyurethane foams having increased fire retardancy and
157
The sole claim on appeal was directed
dimensional strength.
158
to the water-insoluable polyol compound.
The written
159
description issue arose in the context of a § 102(b) rejection.
The examiner rejected the application on the basis that the
parent application did not provide an adequate written
description of the polyol product, and thus the applicant was
not entitled to the benefit of the filing date of the parent
160
The court, in determining whether
application under § 120.
the application was entitled to priority under § 120, looked to
161
The process
the description provided for the polyol product.
162
of production described the polyol product.
The court held
that the description in the parent application was not defective
“merely because appellants chose to describe their claimed
compound by the process of making it; [the court’s] primary
concern is whether the description requirement has been
163
complied with, not the mode selected for compliance.”
Although stating that the written description requirement was
dependent on the facts of each case, the court found that “an
adequate description of the aforementioned reactions is,
concomitantly, an adequate description of the claimed
164
compound.”
Edwards maintained the propriety of adequately

156. Kennecott, 835 F.2d at 1422.
157. See Edwards, 568 F.2d at 1350.
158. See id. (listing Claim 3 as “[a] water-insoluble polyol having the
property of self-catalyzing reaction with organic polyisocyanates to form rigid
polyurethane foam . . . .”).
159. See id.
160. See id. at 1350-51; 35 U.S.C. § 120 (1994) (stating that the applicant
may receive the benefit of the earlier filing date if the second application
meets the disclosure requirements of § 112 and specifically makes reference to
the earlier filing).
161. See Edwards 568 F.2d at 1351.
162. See id.
163. Id. at 1352.
164. Id.
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165

describing a chemical product by the process of making it.
The Edwards court maintained the idea that the manner of
sufficient disclosure was not dispositive in determining
166
whether the written description provided was adequate.
Instead, the dispositive issue was whether the inventor had
167
demonstrated possession.
Case law in the chemical arts, in
addition to establishing that description of a product was
sufficient if the process was disclosed, established that “a
specification can be amended to describe and claim the purity
state of the chemical that results from an adequately disclosed
method if that is an inherent characteristic of what was
168
taught.”
169
In In re Nathan, the claims on appeal concerned halo
170
steroids.
The application was amended to include the alpha
orientation of the claimed compounds, but the amendment was
rejected as new matter because the original disclosure
171
The board sustained the
contained no basis for the addition.
examiner’s new matter rejection, stating that it was “not
satisfied that extraneous evidence discovered after the filing of
the application can be used as support for a stereoconfiguration
172
The appellants argued that “the
not originally disclosed.”
amendment merely defines more precisely for those skilled in
the art the 2-steroids inherently produced by the process of the
application as filed and identified therein by physical
173
The CCPA agreed and found that the
characteristics.”
amendment simply concerned disclosure of an inherent
174
property in the original application, and was not new matter.
165. See id. at 1354.
166. See id. at 1351-52.
167. See id. at 1352.
168. Sherry M. Knowles, Written Description and Enablement
Requirements for Pharmaceutical, Chemical and Biotechnology Inventions, 619
PLI/PAT 1261,1273 (2000). Ms. Knowles also presents a discussion of the In re
Nathan, 328 F.2d 1005 (C.C.P.A. 1964); In re Magerlein, 346 F.2d 609
(C.C.P.A. 1965); and Spero v. Ringold, 377 F.2d 652 (C.C.P.A. 1967) decisions.
169. In re Nathan, 328 F.2d 1005 (C.C.P.A. 1965).
170. See id. at 1006.
171. See id. at 1006-07.
172. Id. at 1008.
173. Id.
174. See id. at 1008-09.
It seems to us that the issue here is whether appellants’ identification
of their 2-halo steroids in their original disclosure is adequate to
identify the claimed subject matter and whether there is sufficient
evidence in the record to show the alpha orientation to be an inherent
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A similar factual situation arose in In re Magerlein.
Magerlein also concerned an amendment made to an
application concerning steroid compounds in order to indicate
176
The court determined that the holding in
configuration.
Nathan applied and remanded to the PTO for further factual
177
determination.
178
The Spero v. Ringold decision accords with the Nathan
and Magerlein decisions. Spero arose from the context of an
interference in which the board had awarded priority to
179
The count in question concerned progesterone and
Ringold.
180
its lower fatty acid esters.
The methyl substituent at the
sixth position of the progresterone ring was in the alpha steric
181
Ringold claimed benefit of a Mexican filing
configuration.
182
dated September 8, 1956, under § 119.
Spero relied upon the
earlier filing date of his parent application dated November 23,
183
Spero
1956, to establish constructive reduction to practice.
had also unsuccessfully introduced evidence establishing
184
conception as of August 23, 1956.
Spero’s parent application disclosed 6-methylprogesterone
and a process for its production, but failed to disclose the steric
185
configuration of the progesterone ring at the sixth position.
Spero’s evidence demonstrated that the failure to disclose the
steric configuration of some of the compounds was a result of
the fact that the inventor had not conceived of it at the time the

characteristic of the subject matter so identified. If the answers are
in the affirmative then appellants’ amendment specifying the alpha
orientation for the 2-halo substituent is not new matter but rather is
merely a statement of an inherent property of the steroids as
disclosed in appellants’ original disclosure.
Id.
175. In re Magerlein, 346 F.2d 609 (C.C.P.A. 1965).
176. See id. at 611.
177. See id. at 612.
178. Spero v. Ringold, 377 F.2d 652 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
179. See id. at 654.
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. See id.; see 35 U.S.C. § 119 (1994) (stating that when an applicant
applies for a patent within 12 months of having applied for a patent for the
same invention in a foreign country that grants similar privileges, the
applicant will receive the benefit of the date that the foreign patent
application was filed).
183. See Spero, 377 F.2d at 654.
184. See id.
185. See id. at 655.
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186

application was filed.
Expert testimony established that
although the inventor did not know of the configuration, an
187
expert in the art would know of the predictable configuration.
In summary, the inventor did not know of the configuration,
did not disclose it in the original application, and did not
disclose inherent properties of the chemical. But one of
ordinary skill in the art would know the configuration because
188
The Spero court applied
the configuration was predictable.
the analysis of the Nathan decision and awarded priority to
189
The fact that the inventor did not know of the
Spero.
configuration and had failed to disclose inherent properties of
the claimed product in the original application was
190
The dispositive issue was “that people skilled in
irrelevant.
the art would have known there were two possible
configurations, and the procedure disclosed in the application
191
worked to produce only one of them.”
Hayes and Smythe establish that an applicant may provide
a functional description sufficient to satisfy the written
192
Reynolds
description requirement in the mechanical arts.
and Kennecott establish that written description for mechanical
inventions may also be satisfied through inherent functional
193
disclosures.
The specification satisfies the written
186. See id.
187. See id. (stating “Thus, we have the anomalous situation presented
that while the inventor may not have known the configuration of the
compound produced by his process, an expert in the art testified that the
compound necessarily has the predictable configuration which meets the
count.”).
188. See Knowles, supra note 168, at 1274
The facts were that: the inventors did not know what the specific
configuration was when they filed the application; they did not
specifically name the . . . configuration when they filed the
application; it was known to chemists that there were only two
possible configurations[;] . . . the procedure described in the
application worked to produce only one[;] . . . and the application did
not name or disclose any of the ‘identifying characteristics’ of the . . .
product.
Id.
189. See Spero, 377 F.2d at 660.
190. See Knowles, supra note 168, at 1275 (“[T]he Spero court held it did
not matter that the inventors did not know what the specific configuration
was, or that it did not recite ‘identifying characteristics’”).
191. Id.
192. See In re Hayes Microcomputer Prods., 982 F.2d 1527, 1534 (Fed. Cir.
1992); In re Smythe, 480 F.2d 1376, 1384 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
193. See In re Reynolds, 443 F.2d 384, 389 (C.C.P.A. 1971); Kennecott
Corp. v. Kyocera Int’l, Inc., 835 F.2d 1419, 1421-22 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
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description requirement for mechanical inventions when it
194
literally discloses the structure, discloses the function rather
195
196
than structure, or by disclosing inherent functions.
In the
chemical arts, Edwards establishes that a chemical product can
197
adequately be described by the method of preparation.
Nathan, Magerlein, and Spero further establish that inherent
properties disclosed in an earlier application could readily
198
A specification provides
support amendatory material.
sufficient written description for a chemical compound when it
literally describes the compound by name or structure, by
199
inherent disclosures, or by the process of its production.
Similarly, under the modern written description era, a
specification provided sufficient support for biotechnology
inventions by describing the invention in a manner other than
200
This stands in sharp contrast to the treatment
by structure.
of biotechnology inventions in the postmodern era discussed in
201
Part IV.
202
In re Fisher, an early biotechnology written description
decision, applied the rationale of the mechanical and chemical
203
204
cases discussed above. The invention claimed in Fisher was
194. See Knowles, supra note 168, at 1272.
195. See Hayes Microcomputer Prods., 982 F.2d at 1534; Smythe, 480 F.2d
at 1384.
196. See Reynolds, 443 F.2d at 389; Kennecott, 835 F.2d at 1421-22.
197. See Knowles, supra note 168, at 1273.
198. See id. at 1273-75.
199. See Knowles, supra note 168, at 1272-73
The written description requirement is met for chemicals and
pharmaceuticals (small organic molecules) when the specification
either (i) literally describes the claimed compound by structure or
name or (ii) inherently describes the claimed compound through a
description that establishes that the claimed compound was in the
possession of the applicant as of the filing date of the application. . . .
The bulk of the controversy on written description in the chemical
and pharmaceutical context arises in applications that do not include
literal description of the claimed compound, but which include an
asserted inherent description.
Id. Furthermore, the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals stated, “an
adequate description of a chemical process can constitute a written description
of the chemicals made by that process.” Id. at 1273.
200. Id. at 1273.
201. See infra Part IV.A-C.
202. In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
203. See id. at 838.
204. The claims at issue were:
4. An adrenocorticotrophic hormone preparation containing at least 1
International Unit of ACTH per milligram and containing no more
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an ACTH “hormone preparation containing at least 1
International Unit of ACTH per milligram and containing no
more than 0.08 units of vasopressin and no more than 0.05
units of oxytocin per International Unit of ACTH, and
205
Previous ACTH
[containing] . . . at least 24 amino acids.”
preparations were disfavored for human treatment because of
low potency and the presence of undesirable posterior pituitary
206
The specification disclosed a method of producing
hormones.
the ACTH preparations that described extraction of ACTH
from frozen pituitary glands of hogs, sheep, beef, whales, and
207
other animals, but did not disclose the amino acid sequence of
208
the ACTH recited in the claim.
The board affirmed the examiner’s rejection of claim 4
209
under § 112.
Fisher had attempted to obtain the benefit of
210
his earlier parent application under § 120.
The board
affirmed the rejection because the parent application contained
no structural description of the ACTH extracts claimed in claim
than 0.08 units of vasopressin and no more than 0.05 units of oxytocin
per International Unit of ACTH, and being further characterized as
containing as the active component of [a?] polypeptide of at least 24
amino acids having the following sequence from the N terminus of the
molecule; Serine, Tyrosine, Serine, Methionine, Glutamic Acid,
Histadine, Phenylalanine, Arginine, Tryptophan, Glycine, Lysine,
Proline, Valine, Glycine, Lysine, Lysine, Arginine, Arginine, Proline,
Valine, Lysine, Valine, Tyrosine, Proline.
5. An adrenocorticotrophic hormone preparation containing at least 1
International Unit of ACTH per milligram and containing no more
than 0.08 units of vasopressin and no more than 0.05 units of oxytocin
per International Unit of ACTH, and being further characterized by
its solubility in glacial acetic acid and phenol; by its relative
insolubility in other organic solvents; by its greater stability under
acid conditions than under alkali conditions; by its susceptibility to
attack by proteolitic enzymes and peptidases; and by its positive
reaction to the Millon and xanthoproteic tests for tyrosine, the biuret
test for peptide linkages, and the ninhydrin test for free amino groups
in the alpha position, the Sakaguchi test for guanidine groups, and
the Hopkins-Gole and benzaldehyde tests for indole nuclei and
tryptophane.
Id. at 835.
205. Id.; see also KENNETH J. BURSHFIEL, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT § 7.2(a) (1995) (describing how Fisher illustrates that the
written description requirement is satisfied by the disclosure of a biological
product having specific and known functions without needing a description of
its chemical structure).
206. See Fisher, 427 F.2d at 834.
207. See id.
208. See id. at 835.
209. See id. at 836.
210. See id.
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4 and because the products disclosed in the parent application
211
were insufficient to support a claim of the breadth of claim 4.
Fisher argued that the parent application inherently disclosed
products covered by claim 4, even though he was unaware of
the chemical structure at the time of filing the parent
212
The CCPA agreed with Fisher’s argument that
application.
213
Nathan and other cases had established the propriety of
inherent disclosures in satisfying the § 112 written description
214
The Fisher holding recognizes that a
requirement.
biotechnology invention may be described by function rather
215
and thus avoids the need to
than chemical structure,
segregate biotechnology from other fields of inventions.
Each of the cases discussed above properly shifted focus
from the manner of satisfying the written description
requirement to a determination of whether the invention had
adequately demonstrated possession of the claimed invention
at the time of filing.
The postmodern view of written
description as applied to biotechnology inventions stands in
216
This postmodern view segregates
sharp contrast.
biotechnology inventions in assessing the manner of satisfying
217
the requirement. The focus of the written description inquiry
for biotechnology inventions is not primarily upon whether one
skilled in the art would be informed of possession by the
inventor as of the filing date, but rather, upon the manner in
218
which the biotechnology invention must be described.
Shifting the focus to the sufficient manner of description
coupled with the requirement that the only manner that will
satisfy written description for biotechnology is best explained
as a policy judgment designed to prevent overbroad
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. In re Nathan, 328 F.2d 1005 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
214. See Fisher, 427 F.2d at 836.
215. See Burchfiel, supra note 205, at 150. The author notes:
As illustrated in Fisher, the written description requirement is
satisfied by the disclosure of a biological product having specific and
known biological function, without any description of its chemical
structure, which may be unknown. A written description of such a
biotechnology invention does not require that the specification recite
the nucleic acid sequence of a gene invention, or the amino acid
sequence of a polypeptide product.
Id.
216. See infra Part IV.
217. See infra Part IV.
218. See Ren, supra note 32, at 1308.
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219

biotechnology patents.
The practical significance of this shift
is that the distinction between written description and
enablement is blurred. Postmodernism also maintains no
distinction between original claims and subsequently filed
claims.
IV.THE POSTMODERN WRITTEN DESCRIPTION
REQUIREMENT
The current, or postmodern, written description
requirement is aptly viewed as a wholly separate paradigm of
legal thought because of its grave departure from the modern
view. The trilogy of the postmodern movement in written
description case law operates on an underlying policy
determination that overbroad biotechnology patents should be
curbed. After the trilogy, legal issues long thought resolved
220
Practitioners now question
bubbled back to the surface.
whether the written description requirement is a separate
requirement from enablement, whether possession is still the
proper test for written description, and why original claims
221
Each of these issues is
present written description issues.
discussed in turn by an analysis of the postmodern trilogy.
A. AMGEN V. CHUGAI
222

Amgen v. Chugai
marks the change in tide for the
application of the written description requirement to
biotechnology inventions, even though Amgen is not a written
223
The inventions in Amgen concerned the
description case.
production of erythropoietin (EPO) through the use of
224
Genetics Institute (GI) owned
recombinant DNA technology.
a patent that claimed homogenous EPO, compositions thereof,
and a process of purifying EPO using reverse-phase, high-

219. See Sara Dastgheib-Vinarov, A Higher Nonobviousness Standard for
Gene Patents: Protecting Biomedical Research From the Big Chill, 4 MARQ.
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 143, 144 (2000).
220. See infra Part IV.C.1-3.
221. See infra Part IV.C.1-3.
222. Amgen v. Chugai, 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
223. See Stewart, supra note 77, at 549, 550 (stating “[e]ven though the
court focused mainly on the completeness of conception, applying the doctrine
of simultaneous conception and reduction to practice, many other courts use
the reasoning from Amgen as a foundation to determine the sufficiency of a
written description for applications claiming DNA sequences.”).
224. See Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1203.
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225

performance liquid chromatography. Amgen’s patent covered
isolated DNA sequences encoding EPO and host cells
226
Amgen
transformed or transfected with a DNA sequence.
brought a patent infringement suit against Genetics Institute
for direct infringement, and against Chugai for contributory
227
Thus, Amgen presented a § 102(g) priority
infringement.
225. See id. The relevant claims in the GI patent read as follows:
1. Homogenous erythropoietin characterized by a molecular weight of
about 34,000 daltons on SDS PAGE, movement as a single peak on
reverse phase high performance liquid chromatography and a specific
activity of at least 160,000 IU per absorbance unit at 280 nanometers.
3. A pharmaceutical composition for the treatment of anemia
comprising a therapeutically effective amount of the homogenous
erythropoietin of claim 1 in a pharmaceutically acceptable vehicle.
4. Homogenous erythropoietin characterized by a molecular weight of
about 34,000 daltons on SDS PAGE, movement as a single peak on
reverse phase high performance liquid chromatography and a specific
activity of at least about 160,000 IU per absorbance unit at 280
nanometers.
6. A pharmaceutical composition for the treatment of anemia
comprising a therapeutically effective amount of the homogenous
erythropoietin of claim 4 in a pharmaceutically acceptable vehicle.
Id.
226. See id. at 1204. The relevant claims in the Amgen patent read as
follows:
2. A purified and isolated DNA sequence consisting essentially of a
DNA sequence encoding human erythropoietin.
4. A procaryotic or eucaryotic host cell transformed or transfected
with a DNA sequence according to claim 1, 2, or 3 in a manner
allowing the host cell to express erythropoietin. 6. A procaryotic or
eucaryotic host cell stably transformed or transfected with a DNA
vector according to claim 5.
7. A purified and isolated DNA sequence consisting essentially of a
DNA sequence encoding a polypeptide having an amino acid sequence
sufficiently duplicative of that of erythropoietin to allow possession of
the biological property of causing bone marrow cells to increase
production of reticulocytes and red blood cells, and to increase
hemoglobin synthesis or iron uptake.
8. A cDNA sequence according to claim 7.
23. A procaryotic or eucaryotic host cell transformed or transfected
with a DNA sequence according to claim 7, 8, or 11 in a manner
allowing the host cell to express said polypeptide.
24. A transformed or transfected host cell according to claim 23
which host cell is capable of glycosylating said polypeptide.
25.A transformed or transfected mammalian host cell according to
claim 24.
26.A transformed or transfected COS cell according to claim 25.
27.A transformed or transfected CHO cell according to claim 25.
29. A prokaryotic host cell stably transformed or transfected with a
DNA vector according to claim 28.
Id.
227. See id.
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228

dispute in the context of a patent infringement suit.
The court innocuously recited precedent stating that
“[c]onception is the ‘formation in the mind of the inventor, of a
definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative
229
invention, as it is hereafter to be applied in practice.’”
Significantly, the court stated that conception of a chemical
compound cannot occur unless the inventor has “a mental
picture of the structure of the chemical, or is able to define it by
its method of preparation, its physical or chemical properties,
230
The
or whatever characteristics sufficiently distinguish it.”
court admitted that the doctrine of simultaneous conception
and reduction to practice applied in the case at hand,
concluding:
We hold that when an inventor is unable to envision the detailed
constitution of a gene so as to distinguish it from other materials, as
well as a method for obtaining it, conception has not been achieved
until reduction to practice has occurred, i.e., until after the gene has
231
been isolated.

Amgen is a limited holding. The context of the decision was a §
232
102(g) priority dispute.
The court only required that the
DNA sequence be disclosed in a manner that sufficiently
distinguishes it; the DNA sequence could be defined by its
233
actual structure as well as its method of preparation.

228. See Pitlick, supra note 40, at 212 (stating “[t]he issue in Amgen
relevant to the present discussion was whether Amgen’s patent was invalid
under 35 USC [§] 102(g) over prior invention of another.”).
229. Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1206 (quoting Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal
Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
230. Id.
231. Id. In determining priority of invention, the court recited precedent
stating that “[c]onception is the ‘formation in the mind of the inventor, of a
definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention, as it is
hereafter to be applied in practice.’” Id. (quoting Hybritech, 802 F.2d at 1376).
The court admitted that the doctrine of simultaneous conception and reduction
to practice applied in the case at hand. See id. (stating that “[i]n some
instances, an inventor is unable to establish a conception until he has reduced
the invention to practice through a successful experiment. This situation
results in a simultaneous conception and reduction to practice. . . . We agree
with the district court that that is what occurred in this case.”).
232. See Pitlick, supra note 40, at 212 (noting “[t]his ‘holding’ is warranted
by the facts so long as it is taken in context, which is that of an inventor
seeking to establish a date of invention under 35 USC [§] 102(g).”).
233. See Stewart, supra note 77, at 550. Stewart also points out:
The court did not invoke the requirement that the actual DNA
sequence be disclosed, but only that the DNA be defined in a way to
distinguish it from other chemicals along with a description of how to
obtain it. This left open the possibility of adequately describing a
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B. FIERS V. REVEL
234

The expansion of the Amgen holding in Fiers v. Revel was
akin to prestidigitation. The Federal Circuit considered a
decision of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences
awarding priority of invention to Sugano in a three-way
235
The interference involved a single
interference proceeding.
count: “[a] DNA which consists essentially of a DNA which
236
codes for a human fibroblast interferon-beta polypeptide.”
Fiers attempted to establish conception and a diligent
reduction to practice based upon an earlier filed British
237
The board, relying upon Amgen, had concluded
application.
that Fiers was only entitled to the priority of the British filing
date because only that application disclosed the sequence of the
DNA coding for the human fibroblast interferon-beta
238
Fiers attempted to distinguish Amgen but the
polypeptide.
239
efforts proved futile.
Fiers argued that Amgen should not be
interpreted as establishing a rule that conception of DNA
coding for a protein could not occur until the nucleotide
sequence was determined, and that Amgen should be limited to
the facts wherein the isolation of the sequence was in doubt due
240
Fiers argued that his method could
to technical difficulties.
have easily been carried out by one of ordinary skill in the
241
Ultimately, Fiers contended that conception of a DNA
art.
242
molecule could be defined by the method of preparation.
The
Federal
Circuit
found
Fiers’
arguments
243
unpersuasive.
The court explicitly rejected any attempt to
distinguish Amgen and any attempt to assert “that the
existence of a workable method for preparing a DNA
244
The court held that
establishes conception of that material.”
a process could define a chemical product, but would only

particular DNA even when the inventor is unaware of its structure.
Id.
234. Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
235. See id. at 1166.
236. Id.
237. See id. at 1168-69.
238. See id. at 1168.
239. See id. at 1168-69.
240. See id. at 1168.
241. See id.
242. See id.
243. See id. at 1169.
244. Id.
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245

support a product by process claim.
The Fiers claim was a
product claim, and by the Amgen holding, conception required
246
The court
definition by more than its biological function.
added that “[w]hile one does not need to have carried out one’s
invention before filing a patent application, one does need to be
247
able to describe that invention with particularity.”
Revel’s case for priority depended upon an earlier filed
248
Israeli application.
The board concluded that Revel’s U.S.
application was not entitled to the benefit of the filing date of
the Israeli application on the basis that the Israeli application
failed to satisfy the written description requirement, i.e.,
249
Revel
because it failed to disclose the nucleotide sequence.
cited to substantial correspondence in the language of the
Israeli claim and the interference count as basis for compliance
250
Because the
with the written description requirement.
language of the count referred to DNA and not a specific
sequence, Revel argued that the specification did not need to
refer to a specific sequence in order to satisfy written
251
description.
252
The court rejected Revel’s arguments.
The court held
that “[a]n adequate written description of a DNA requires more
than a mere statement that it is part of the invention and
reference to a potential method for isolating it; what is required
253
is a description of the DNA itself.” The court equated written
description with conception, stating that “[i]f a conception of a
DNA requires a precise definition, such as by structure,
formula, chemical name, or physical properties, as we have
held, then a description also requires that degree of
specificity . . . . [O]ne cannot describe what one has not

245. See id. The court also held, “[c]onception of a substance claimed per se
without reference to a process requires conception of its structure, name,
formula, or definitive chemical or physical properties.” Id.
246. See id.
247. Id.
248. See id.
249. See id. at 1170-71.
250. See id. at 1170.
251. See id.
252. See id. at 1170-71.
253. Id. at 1170. The court also noted that this finding was in line with
Amgen, stating, “[w]e thus determined that, irrespective of the complexity or
simplicity of the method of isolation employed, conception of a DNA, like
conception of any chemical substance, requires a definition of that substance
other than by its functional utility.” Id. at 1169.
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254

conceived.”
Some commentators contend that this language
in the Fiers decision presents a change in the possession test
255
Essentially, “one does not have
articulated in Vas-Cath.
possession of a claimed invention until one can describe the
256
The
invention with some minimum amount of specificity.”
amount of specificity required to demonstrate possession of a
DNA invention would be tantamount to demonstrating
257
However the limitations in Amgen discussed
conception.
above were read right out of the Fiers decision. A recitation of
structure was required.
The Fiers decision is notable for presenting a change in the
possession test for biotechnology inventions. Additionally,
Fiers is important because the decision applied written
description to original claims in the application as filed. These
two developments set the precedent for the written description
turnaround in Eli Lilly.
C. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA V. ELI LILLY & CO.
258

Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co.
completes the shift in written description jurisprudence. The
University of California (UC) brought suit in 1990 against Eli
Lilly alleging infringement of two patents relating to
259
Specifically, the patents
recombinant DNA technology.
related to “recombinant plasmids and microorganisms that
260
Persons who are unable to produce
produce human insulin.”
261
insulin suffer from diabetes.
Prior to the advent of
recombinant technology for producing human insulin to treat
diabetes, animal insulin was used, which often caused allergic
254. Id. at 1171. See also, Pitlick, supra note 40, at 215-16. Pitlick
concludes:
The court thus essentially equated the requirements for complying
with the description requirement with those for conception of an
invention. In doing so, it treated Revel’s case for priority, in essence,
the same as it treated Fiers’, ignoring the fact that Revel, unlike
Fiers, was relying on the filing of a patent application, and thus
ignoring the century-old doctrine of constructive reduction to practice.
Id.
255. See Pitlick, supra note 40, at 215-16.
256. Id. at 215.
257. See id. at 215-16.
258. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
259. See id. at 1562.
260. Id.
261. See id.
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reactions.
The ‘525 patent was issued from an application
263
filed in 1977.
The ‘525 patent related to cDNA sequences for
264
rat proinsulin (PI) and preproinsulin (PPI).
The ‘740 patent
265
issued from an application filed in 1979.
The ‘740 patent
covered human PI and PPI cDNA sequences, and tailoring
techniques for the insertion of human PI cDNA into
266
Lilly produced human PI by using
recombinant plasmids.
267
semi-synthetic DNA to produce a cleavable fusion protein.
The produced fusion protein “consists of a bacterial protein, a
‘cleavable linkage’ consisting of a single methionine residue,
268
The human PI was obtained by cleaving it
and human PI.”
269
from the fusion protein.
The district court ruled that claims
262. See id.
263. See id.
264. See id. at 1562-63.
Claim 1 of that patent reads as follows: ‘A recombinant plasmid
replicable in prokaryotic host containing within its nucleotide
sequence a subsequence having the structure of the reverse transcript
of an mRNA of a vertebrate, which mRNA encodes insulin.’ Claim 2
relates to a recombinant prokaryotic microorganism containing
vertebrate insulin-encoding cDNA. Claims 4 and 5 depend from claim
2 and are limited, respectively, to mammalian and human insulin
cDNA. Claim 6 depends from claim 1 and requires that the plasmid
contain ‘at least one genetic determinant of the plasmid col E1.’ Claim
7 depends from claim 2 and requires that the microorganism be of a
particular strain.
Id. at 1562-63.
265. See id. at 1562.
266. See id.
Independent claim 2 of the ‘740 patent reads: “A DNA transfer vector
comprising an inserted cDNA consisting essentially of a
deoxyribonucleotide sequence coding for human proinsulin, the plus
strand of said cDNA having a defined 5’ end, said 5’ end being the
first deoxyribonucleotide of the sequence coding for said proinsulin.”
Dependent claim 3 is directed, inter alia, to a recombinant
microorganism containing the transfer vector of claim 2. Claim 5
reads: “A DNA transfer vector comprising a deoxynucleotide sequence
coding for human proinsulin consisting essentially of a plus strand
having the sequence: [nucleotides that encode human proinsulin,
described in structural terms].” Claim 6 depends from claim 5 in the
same manner that claim 3 depends from claim 2: it is directed to a
recombinant microorganism containing the transfer vector of claim 5.
Claim 8 is directed to an example of a human PI-encoding
recombinant plasmid described in the specification; and claims 9 and
10, to microorganisms containing that plasmid. Claims 13 and 14 are
directed to a subset of the transfer vector genus of claim 5 and
accordingly depend from claim 5.
Id.
267. See id.
268. Id.
269. See id.
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1, 2 and 4-7 in the ‘525 patent were invalid under § 112,
because the specification did not provide an adequate written
270
description of the cDNA covered in the claims.
The Federal Circuit affirmed, relying on Fiers which held
that adequate written description of a DNA molecule “‘requires
a precise definition, such as by structure, formula, chemical
name, or physical properties,’ not a mere wish or plan for
271
obtaining the claimed chemical invention.” The court focused
its written description analysis upon claim 5, which was
272
directed to a microorganism containing human insulin cDNA.
The microorganism was defined in claim 5 as requiring human
273
cDNA. UC pointed to prophetic example 6 in the application,
which provided a method of obtaining the cDNA and amino
274
UC
acid sequences of the A and B chains for human insulin.
argued that prophetic example 6 in the specification provided
275
an adequate written description for claim 5.
The specification failed to provide a written description of
the invention for claim 5 because it did not provide sequence
information, i.e., it did not provide which nucleotides comprise
276
the human cDNA in claim 5. Furthermore, the description of
the A and B chains did not provide adequate written
277
description. The description of human insulin A and B amino
acid sequences was not a sufficient written description by
analogy to the court’s DNA obviousness holding in In re
278
Deuel.
The court held that even a disclosure that would
render the invention obvious could still fail to satisfy the
279
In sum, the court affirmed
written description requirement.
the district court’s holding that claim 5 was invalid for lack of
written description because the specification only provided a

270. See id. at 1566.
271. Id. at 1566 (quoting Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 (Fed. Cir.
1993)); see also Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1566-67 (“[A]n adequate written
description of a DNA requires more than a mere statement that it is part of
the invention and reference to a potential method for isolating it; what is
required is a description of the DNA itself”) (quoting Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1170)).
272. See Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1567.
273. See id.
274. See id.
275. See id.
276. See id.
277. See id. (analogizing the case of In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir.
1995)).
278. See id.
279. See id.
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method of isolating the cDNA and a description of human
280
insulin A and B chains. The court stated that:
[t]he name cDNA is not itself a written description of that DNA; it
conveys no distinguishing information concerning its identity. While
the example provides a process for obtaining human insulin-encoding
cDNA, there is no further information in the patent pertaining to that
cDNA’s relevant structural or physical characteristics; in other words,
it thus does not describe human insulin cDNA. Describing a method
of preparing cDNA or even describing the protein that the cDNA
encodes, as the example does, does not necessarily describe the cDNA
281
itself.

The Eli Lilly decision was a culmination of the court’s prior
decisions in Amgen and Fiers. Armed with these three
decisions, the court departed from the established written
description jurisprudence in the application of the possession
test and the application of the written description requirement
to originally filed claims in the application. The court also
shifted focus to the manner needed to satisfy written
description in biotechnology inventions. Each of these issues is
discussed in turn.
Editorial Note: On July 15, 2002, the Federal Circuit decided
Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc.,a a case with potential
relevance to this article. The court held that the placement of a
DNA in a public depository combined with a reference to the
deposit in a patent specification may satisfy the written
description requirement.b In addition, the court stated that not
“all functional descriptions of genetic material fail to meet the
written description requirement.”c
Accordingly, the PTO
Guidelines allowing “functional characteristics when coupled with
a known or disclosed correlation between function and structure”d
to meet the written description requirement were adopted by the
court.e Despite this apparent concession, a divided Federal Circuit
declined the opportunity to rehear the case en bancf to address the
280. See id.
281. Id.
a. Enzo Biochem, 296 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
b. See id. at 1326.
c. Id. at 1324.
d. Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications Under the 35
U.S.C. 112, ¶ 1, “Written Description” Requirement, 66 Fed. Reg. 1099, 1106
(2001).
e. See 296 F.3d at 1324.
f. See Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 42 Fed. Appx. 439, 439
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (presenting the arguments for and against rehearing the case
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“structure-only” requirement of Eli Lilly.g The effect of this
decision on the written description doctrine remains unclear.
Therefore, because the effects of Enzo Biochem are unclear the
analysis of this article remains unchanged.

1. The Test for Written Description
As noted above, the test for written description focused
extensively on the importance of demonstrating that the
inventor had possession of the invention at the time of filing
282
The
the application to those of ordinary skill in the art.
Federal Circuit in the Eli Lilly decision carved out a separate
written requirement for biotechnology inventions using Fiers as
283
Although the 1952 Patent Act only has one written
its basis.
description requirement, American patent law has two
judicially created written description standards: one for
284
biotechnology inventions and another for all other inventions.
The overarching concern in applying written description to
285
biotechnology is that of preventing overreaching.
Overly
broad patents in biotechnology cause shivers in the societal
spine, and the judiciary is not excluded.
2. Manner of Satisfying Written Description
The manner of satisfying written description became a
prime concern in the area of biotechnology after the Eli Lilly

en banc).
g. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
282. See In re Smythe, 480 F.2d 1376, 1384 (CCPA 1973).
283. See Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1567.
284. Eli Lilly created this divergence:
The Federal Circuit in Lilly set forth two standards it would use for
the written description requirement. First was the traditional
standard, which requires that a written description of an invention
clearly convey to a person with ordinary skill in the art that the
inventor invented the claimed invention. Second was the DNAspecific standard that the Federal Circuit established in Fiers, which
requires that a DNA molecule be described by structure, formula,
chemical name, or physical properties. While relying only on the
DNA-specific standard together with an “obviousness” rationale to
strike down the human insulin cDNA claim in the ‘525 patent, the
court invoked both the traditional and the DNA-specific standard to
strike down the mammalian and vertebrate insulin cDNA genera
claims.
Ren, supra note 32, at 1308.
285. See generally Dastgheib-Vinarov, supra note 219.
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decision.
For mechanical and chemical inventions, the CCPA
and the Federal Circuit had repeatedly emphasized that the
primacy of written description lies in the ultimate objective of
demonstrating possession, and that the mode of demonstrating
287
After Fiers and Eli Lilly, the
possession was irrelevant.
disparity between biotechnology inventions and all others types
288
In the mechanical arts, one
of inventions became obvious.
was permitted to describe the invention by structure, by
function, by inherent characteristics, or even by inherent
characteristics that were not included in the original
289
In the chemical arts, one could describe a
application.
compound by its structure, by its process, and by inherent
290
As long as one of ordinary skill in the art
characteristics.
would know that the inventor had possession of the invention
at the time of filing, the manner in which the applicant chose to
291
That proposition
describe the invention was irrelevant.
simply does not hold true for biotechnological inventions. A
DNA molecule must be described by structure. Thus, the policy
reason of preventing an undue burden by permitting an
applicant to describe an invention functionally or by a process
was discarded for biotechnological inventions.
Mechanical and chemical inventions can be described in
any manner sufficient to demonstrate possession. Requiring
recitation of structure in biotechnology inventions presents a
two-fold conundrum. Why should biotechnology inventions be
segregated from other fields of inventions? Also, why did the
postmodern trilogy depart from the Fisher decision?
As
discussed above, the Fisher court applied the rationale of the
292
mechanical and chemical cases to biotechnology inventions.
The Fisher holding renders acceptance of the holy written
description trilogy impossible because it establishes that the
CCPA considered biotechnology inventions no different than
inventions in other arts. The disparity between biotechnology
as an artistic endeavor and other endeavors is unjustified
based on precedent alone.

286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

See generally Ren, supra note 32, at 1308.
See supra Part III.
See Ren, supra note 32, at 1308.
See supra Part III.
See supra Part III.
See supra Part III.
See supra Part III, pp. 76-76.
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3. The Application To Originally Filed Claims
Fiers and Eli Lilly presented another change in the written
description jurisprudence by applying the requirement to
293
claims that were originally filed in the patent application.
Case law before Fiers, as discussed extensively above,
identified the written description function as that of ensuring
294
This function
that the proper date of invention was fixed.
makes sense when the claims at issue were added after the
295
When the claims are original to the
original filing date.
application, however, the requisite function of ensuring a
296
The identified
proper filing date is necessarily served.
function of the written description requirement must
necessarily be different when applied to original claims in a
297
biotechnology patent application.
The most provocative question raised by the Fiers and Eli
Lilly decisions relates to the application of the written
298
description requirement to original claims in the application.
Why did the Federal Circuit choose to depart from 30 years of
case law, which exclusively applied the written description
requirement to claims added subsequent to the original filing
date? What purpose does this new requirement serve as
applied to original claims? The answers to these complex

293. See Fiers v. Revel, 984 F. 2d 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1993); see also Regents of
the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
294. See supra Part III.
295. See supra Part III.
296. Pitlick explains the possession-disclosure connection:
I could find no case since the first case that recognized a separate
description requirement under the 1952 Patent Act, and prior to
Fiers, in which the Federal Circuit, or its predecessors CCPA or Court
of Claims, found the description requirement not satisfied where the
claimed subject matter had literal support in the original disclosure
or found that such claimed subject matter was not constructively
reduced to practice by the filing of a patent application . . . .
[I]t is logically impossible for an inventor not to be in possession of an
invention as of the date that invention is disclosed in a patent
application.
Pitlick, supra note 40, at 211 (emphasis in original).
297. The rationale for applying written description more stringently to
biotechnology patent applications arises from the perceived difference in the
biotechnology arts as compared to the mechanical arts. Biotechnology is
admittedly more nebulous because a DNA molecule cannot readily be
functionally envisioned in the same manner a mechanical hinge or screw can
be. Therefore, technology is disparately treated by the courts.
298. See generally Fiers, 984 F. 2d at 1164; see also Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at
1559.
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questions can only be determined with reference to the role
that written description serves in light of the court’s
obviousness holdings.
The Eli Lilly court’s explicit reference to the seminal
obviousness decision, Deuel, presents an irresistible
opportunity to analyze the role of obviousness in written
description analysis.
The Eli Lilly court held that “a
description that does not render a claimed invention obvious
299
The general
does not sufficiently describe that invention.”
method of isolating a cDNA molecule along with a disclosure of
the structure of the protein that the cDNA encodes was
insufficient to satisfy written description by analogy to In re
300
Deuel.
The invention in Deuel related to isolated and purified
DNA and cDNA molecules encoding heparin-binding growth
301
HBGFs stimulate mitogenic activity that
factors (HBGF).
302
facilitates repair of damaged tissue.
Deuel isolated and
purified HBGF from bovine uterine tissue, and determined the
303
first twenty-five amino acids of the N-terminal sequence.
Deuel then isolated cDNA encoding for the bovine HBGF by
screening the bovine DNA library with an oligonucleotide
304
Deuel purified the cDNA and found that its sequence
probe.
305
consisted of 1196 nucleotide base pairs.
The bovine cDNA
was then used as a probe to isolate and purify human placental
306
Deuel isolated, purified, and then determined the
HBGF.
sequence of the human placental cDNA, which consisted of 961

299. Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1567 (emphasis in original).
300. See id.; see also In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
301. The claims on appeal were independent and read as follows:
4. A purified and isolated DNA sequence consisting of a sequence
encoding human heparin binding growth factor of 168 amino acids
having the following amino acid sequence: Met Gln Ala . . .
5. The purified and isolated cDNA of human heparin-binding growth
factor having the following nucleotide sequence: GTCAAAGGCA . . .
6. A purified and isolated DNA sequence consisting of a sequence
encoding bovine heparin binding growth factor of 168 amino acids
having the following amino acid sequence: Met Gln Thr . . .
7. The purified and isolated cDNA of bovine heparin-binding growth
factor having the following nucleotide sequence: GAGTGGAGAG.
Deuel, 51 F.3d at 1555.
302. See id. at 1554.
303. See id. at 1555.
304. See id.
305. See id.
306. See id.
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nucleotide base pairs.
With this knowledge, Deuel predicted
the complete amino acid sequence of the human placental
308
HBGF.
The examiner cited the combined teaching of the Bohlen
and Maniatis references to reject Deuel’s application as prima
309
The Bohlen reference
facie obvious under Section 103.
disclosed heparin-binding brain mitogens (HBBM) useful for
310
Bohlen disclosed the first 19 amino
repairing neural tissue.
acids of the HBBM N-terminal sequence, but provided no
311
teaching concerning cDNA or DNA coding for HBBM. Bohlen
also taught that HBBMs were brain-specific and may be
312
The Maniatis reference taught
homologous between species.
a method of isolating DNA or cDNA by screening libraries with
313
probes. The method was a general method of cloning and did
314
not teach how to isolate any particular DNA or cDNA.
The court considered “whether the combination of a prior
art reference teaching a method of gene cloning, together with
a reference disclosing a partial amino acid sequence of a
protein, may render DNA and cDNA molecules encoding the
315
Deuel claimed the
protein prima facie obvious under § 103.”
316
DNA and cDNA molecules in structural terms.
The court
held that the examiner was required to establish a prima facie
case of obviousness by showing that the combined teachings of
317
Structural
the prior art suggested the claimed compounds.
similarity between prior art compounds and the claimed
compound may provide a basis for an obviousness rejection
because the structural similarity establishes the motivation to
318
make the claimed compound.
The combined teachings of Bohlen and Maniatis only
disclosed a general process of isolating cDNA molecules and
319
The court held that one could
proteins, not DNA molecules.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.

See id.
See id.
See id. at 1555-56.
See id. at 1556.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 1557.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1558.
See id.
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not have conceived of the subject matter claimed by Deuel
“based on the teachings in the cited prior art because, until the
claimed molecules were actually isolated and purified, it would
have been highly unlikely for one of ordinary skill in the art to
contemplate what was ultimately obtained. What cannot be
320
contemplated or conceived cannot be obvious.”
The lynchpin of the Deuel decision is the degeneracy of the genetic
code. . . .The genetic code relationship between proteins and nucleic
acids does not overcome the deficiencies of the cited references. A
prior art disclosure of the amino acid sequence of a protein does not
necessarily render particular DNA molecules encoding the protein
obvious because the redundancy of the genetic code permits one to
hypothesize an enormous number of DNA sequences coding for the
protein. No particular one of these DNAs can be obvious unless there
is something in the prior art to lead to the particular DNA and
321
indicate that it should be prepared.

The court held that a general method of isolating DNA
322
molecules would not render a specific DNA molecule obvious.
Relevant to the written description discussion, the PTO in
Deuel argued that the method of isolation rendered Deuel’s
compounds obvious by analogy to the written description
323
The PTO argued that because a process for
requirement.
making a product could be used to define the product, it could
324
also render the product obvious. The court retorted that
[t]he fact that one can conceive a general process in advance for
preparing an undefined compound does not mean that a claimed
specific compound was precisely envisioned and therefore obvious. A
substance may indeed be defined by its process of preparation. That
occurs, however, when it has already been prepared by that process
and one therefore knows that the result of that process is the stated
compound. The process is part of the definition of the compound. But
that is not possible in advance, especially when the hypothetical
process is only a general one. Thus, a conceived method of preparing
some undefined DNA does not define it with the precision necessary
325
to render it obvious over the protein it encodes.

The Deuel decision clearly rendered the obviousness
rejection based upon degeneracy scarce. Deuel ratcheted down

320. Id.
321. Id. at 1554, 1558-59.
322. See id at 1559 (the existence of a general method of isolating cDNA or
DNA molecules is essentially irrelevant to the question whether the specific
molecules themselves would have been obvious, in the absence of other prior
art that suggests the claimed DNAs.)
323. See id.
324. See id. at 1559-60.
325. Id.
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the obviousness threshold. The expansion of the Deuel
obviousness holding to written description is not selfexplanatory when viewed as a singular issue—it must be
viewed in the context of the entire patent law scheme.
Obviousness and written description are two distinct
requirements for patentability. These requirements serve
different functions and are applied in different manners.
Strangely enough, the court chose to use Deuel to reject UC’s
claim for lack of written description rather than using
326
established written description case law to analyze the case.
However this application of Deuel to written description can be
harmonized when the obviousness trend and the written
description trend for biotechnology inventions are placed side
by side.
As the court ratcheted down the obviousness
threshold, it ratcheted up the written description threshold.
The heightening of the written description requirement
seems economically inevitable in light of the low obviousness
standard presented by Deuel. Written description as applied to
biotechnology cases transcends the simple timing function
327
The written description
initially envisioned by the CCPA.
requirement no longer ensures that subsequently filed claims
are entitled to the original filing date, but rather acts to judge
the advance in the art that an obviousness determination
328
should serve.
The American patent system is perhaps the most complex
and sophisticated framework in the world.
While other
countries are struggling to develop basic patentability criteria,
the United States has managed to take the patent law
development to an elevated stage. Practitioners are faced with
new complex questions no other patent system has yet faced.
The Supreme Court opened the gates to patent eligibility for
329
biotechnology inventions in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, and
subsequently established the United States as a world leader in
biotechnology. Yet Chakrabarty was not the first decision
recognizing the importance of biotechnology patents. The
330
German high court, in its famous Red Dove decision, had
326. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1567
(Fed. Cir. 1997).
327. See Mueller supra note 32, at 621-23.
328. See id.
329. See generally Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
330. See “Rote Taube”—Patentability of Methods of Breeding Animals, 1
INT’L REV. OF INDUS. PROP. AND COPYRIGHT L. 136 (1970).
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already decided that living organisms were patent eligible
subject matter more than ten years before Chakrabarty was
decided. This ten-year gap did not give the German economy
lead time in obtaining biotechnology patents because the
German system failed to economize on their Red Dove
331
By contrast, the Chakrabarty decision opened a
decision.
332
flood of biotechnology patent applications.
The American
patent system is economically realistic and industry friendly.
The Chakrabarty and Deuel decisions were rendered in
order to spur biotechnology innovation and progress. In this
period of time, between Deuel and Eli Lilly, the United States
lead the way in the number of biotechnology patent
applications and prospered from a rapidly growing
biotechnology industry. But economic reality set in once again
and mandated that the free-for-all biotechnology patent
333
This cap came in
application had to be capped in some ways.
the form of the Eli Lilly heightened written description
334
Eli Lilly acts to ‘bridge the gap’ that Deuel
requirement.
created.
Logically, the heightened written description
335
requirement corresponds to the liberal obviousness policy.
If
written description was to serve this important function of

331. See Joseph Straus, Biotechnology and Patents, 54 CHIMIA 293, 293
(2000).
332. Professor Joseph Straus states this view:
Whereas the Red Dove decision had no spectacular economic
implications, this was different with the 1980 landmark decision of
the US Supreme Court in the Diamond v. Chakrabarty case . . . .
[Diamond] was the signal for venture capitalists to pour money into
the efforts of predominantly academic researchers, equipped with the
necessary knowledge, enthusiasm and, last but not least, patent
applications, to establish an entirely new branch of industry.
Id. at 293.
333. An illustration of the numbers clearly showed this need:
[B]etween 1990 and 1998, the total number of biotechnology patents
granted to U.S. corporations has quadrupled. In contrast, between
1990 and 1998, the total number of patents issued increased by about
sixty percent. This large disparity is cause for concern. It suggests
that the biotechnology industry is using the relaxed nonobviousness
standard to obtain genomic patents simply for corporate gain.
Dastgheib-Vinarov, supra note 219, at 165.
334. See id. at 168.
335. Compare In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1558-59 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (lowering
the obviousness threshold), with Regents of the Univ. of Cal. V. Eli Lilly, 119
F.3d 1559, 1566-67 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (heightening the written description
requirement). See also Dastgheib-Vinarov, supra note 219, at 154-57 & 168
(discussing the obviousness holding in Deuel and the written description
requirement in Eli Lilly).
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limiting overly broad biotechnology patents then the court had
to build a written description bridge between the land of
subsequently filed claims to the land of originally filed claims.
Written description is applied to all types of claims, whether
originally filed or subsequently filed, and requires that a DNA
336
molecule must be described structurally. Though the Eli Lilly
requirement may be justified from a policy perspective, it has
no firm basis in legal precedent.
4. Aftershocks of the Postmodern Trilogy
The aftershocks of the postmodern trilogy in written
description law discriminate against biotechnology patents as
to the field of invention.
The disparate treatment of
biotechnology in written description jurisprudence raises major
issues relating to compliance with Article 27(1) of the Trade
Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement of
337
Article 27(1) of TRIPS states that “patents shall be
1994.
available . . . without discrimination as to . . . the field of
338
The biotechnology anomaly in written
technology.”
description law indicates a degree of discrimination related
339
The United States
entirely to the field of technology as such.
may be violating this international agreement. As noted above,
the approach to applying written description to biotechnology
inventions advocated by the trilogy could be justified from a
policy concern that patents in biotechnology are undesirable.
The approach simply is not warranted by thirty years of
precedent or wise in light of international obligations.
The postmodern trilogy heightened the written description
standard. Although technically the test for written description
is still the possession test, written description is now actually a
permutation of the enablement requirement. The showing of
specificity of structure required by the Federal Circuit negates
the assertion that the written description requirement still
occupies its role as a broad requirement in comparison to

336. See Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1567.
337. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1C, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm0_e.htm
(last
visited
November 10, 2002) [hereinafter TRIPS].
338. Id. at Art. 27(1).
339. See Ren supra note 32, at 1297-98. See generally Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at
1559.
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enablement. The written description requirement is fused with
the enablement requirement contrary to the holding in Vas340
Cath.
Finally, the application of written description to
original claims is additional evidence that the requirement is
now being expanded to accomplish a greater purpose. The
departure from the identified function in thirty years of case
law is inadequately explained.
In much the same manner that the Chakrabarty decision
coupled with PTO practice in the 1980s provided individuals
with the ability to capitalize economically on the liberal
attitude of granting biotechnology patents, the recent PTO
Guidelines on written description will retard the grant of
biotechnology patents. The Guidelines incorporate the holdings
of the postmodern trilogy.
V. PTO WRITTEN DESCRIPTION GUIDELINES
On June 15, 1988, the PTO issued interim written
description guidelines in order to address the approach
examiners should take in reviewing biotechnology patent
341
Although the PTO
applications after the Eli Lilly decision.
342
was not obligated to conduct notice and comment rulemaking,
the agency held public meetings in Boston, Massachusetts and
San Diego, California in November 1998 to clarify the proper
343
The PTO
application of the written description requirement.
also requested comments from any interested members of the
public on the Interim Guidelines relating to:
(1) the accuracy of the methodology; (2) relevant factors to consider in
determining whether the written description requirement of 35
U.S.C. [§]112, ¶ 1 is satisfied; (3) whether the scope of these
guidelines should be limited to certain technologies, such as
biotechnology, or even a particular area of biotechnology such as

340. See Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F. 2d 1555, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
341. See Lisa A. Karczewski, Biotechnological Gene Patent Applications:
The Implications of the USPTO Written Description Requirement Guidelines
on the Biotechnology Industry, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1043, 1064-65 (2000).
342. “These guidelines do not constitute substantive rulemaking and hence
do not have the force and effect of law.” Request for Comments on Interim
Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications Under the 35 U.S.C. 112, ¶
1, “Written Description” Requirement, 63 Fed. Reg. 32,639, 32,639 (1998)
[hereinafter Comments on Interim Guidelines]. “Because these Guidelines
only govern internal practices, they are exempt from notice and comment
rulemaking under 5 U.S.C. [§] 553(b)(A).” Guidelines for Examination of
Patent Applications Under the 35 U.S.C. 112, ¶ 1, “Written Description”
Requirement, 66 Fed. Reg. 1099, 1099 (2001) [hereinafter Guidelines].
343. See Karczewski, supra note 341, at 1065.
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nucleic acids, or encompass all technologies generally; (4) whether the
scope of these guidelines should be expanded to include processes
and/or product-by-process claims; and (5) the impact these guidelines
may have on currently pending applications as well as future
344
applications.

After considering comments from 13 individuals and 16
organizations, the PTO revised the Interim Guidelines on
345
The PTO solicited comments on the
December 21, 1999.
Revised Interim Written Description Guidelines regarding the
“1) scope of the guidelines; 2) the accuracy of the methodology;
and 3) the impact these guidelines may have on currently
346
The
pending applications as well as future applications.”
PTO received comments from 48 organizations and 18
347
individuals in response to the Revised Interim Guidelines.
The Revised Interim Guidelines were presented to the public
for comment for a second time because the revision constituted
a sufficient enough change from the previous guidelines that
348
The Guidelines for
additional public comment was desirable.
Examination of Applications Under Written Description were
349
published on January 5, 2001.
A. General Principles
The Guidelines state that the policy objective of the written
350
description requirement is two-fold.
Written description
serves to convey the subject matter claimed by the inventor and
351
The
to place the public in possession of the invention.
invention must be clearly conveyed in such a manner that one
of ordinary skill in the art would know that the inventor had
352
possession of the invention claimed in the application.

344. Comments on Interim Guidelines, supra note 342, at 32,639; see also
Karczewski, supra note 341, at 1065.
345. See Revised Interim Guidelines for Examination of Patent
Applications Under
the 35 U.S.C. 112, ¶ 1, “Written Description”
Requirement; Request for Comments, 64 Fed. Reg. 71,427, 71,427 (1999).
346. Patent & Trademark Office Soc’y, Statement of the P.T.O.S. to the
U.S.P.T.O. On Interim Guidelines For Examination of Patent Applications
Under the 35 U.S.C. 112, First Paragraph “Written Description” Requirement,
81 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 140 (1999).
347. See Guidelines, supra note 342, at 1099.
348. See Stephen G. Kunin, Written Description Guidelines and Utility
Guidelines, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 77, 77 (2000).
349. See Guidelines, supra note 342, at 1099.
350. See id. at 1104.
351. See id.
352. See id.
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Inquiry into whether the specification provides an adequate
written description of the claims may arise in the context of
original, new or amended claims, or claims for priority
353
entitlement under 35 U.S.C. §§ 119, 120, or 365(c).
The Guidelines prescribe a “strong” presumption that
adequate written description is present in the context of
354
original claims. However, this does not negate the possibility
that an original claim could lack sufficient written
355
description. The original claim could be rejected if it omits an
essential or critical feature of the invention, which is not
356
This problem may
adequately described in the specification.
arise when an invention is described by its method coupled
with its function, without a correlation between structure and
357
The written description requirement also arises
function.
when one of ordinary skill in the art could not “immediately
358
envisage the product claimed from the disclosed process.”
New and amended claims do not have the same
359
presumption that original claims have under the Guidelines.
The written description requirement for new and amended
claims prevents an applicant from extending the scope of her
invention by adding material that was not adequately
360
New and amended
described in the application as filed.
claims may give rise to a written description inquiry if a
361
Omission of an
limitation is omitted from the new claim.
essential or critical feature originally disclosed in the
application will not satisfy the written description
362
requirement.
The Guidelines prescribe a methodology for determining
353. See id.
354. See id. at 1105.
355. See id.
356. See id.
357. See id.
358. Id.
359.
There is a strong presumption that an adequate written description of
the claimed invention is present in the specification as filed; however,
with respect to newly added or amended claims, applicant should
show support in the original disclosure for the new or amended
claims. Consequently, rejection of an original claim for lack of written
description should be rare.
Id.
360. See id.
361. See id.
362. See id.
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adequacy of the written description requirement.
This
discussion provides a brief summary of the methodology that
an examiner must use in order to determine whether the
specification provides an adequate written description of the
364
claimed invention.
An examiner must read and analyze the entire
specification to determine compliance with the written
365
The examiner has the initial
description requirement.
burden of presenting evidence or reasons why a person of
ordinary skill in the art would “not recognize that the written
366
description of the invention provides support for the claims.”
The presumption that an original claim complies with written
description may, in practice, operate to make rejections of
367
but that remains to be seen. An
original claims rare,
368
applicant must show support for new and amended claims.
In analyzing the entire specification, the examiner must
properly construe each claim and give it the broadest
369
reasonable construction. The proper construction of the claim
includes consideration of the preamble language, the
transition, and all limitations contained in the preamble, the
370
The examiner must
transition, and the body of the claim.
evaluate the claim to determine if sufficient structures, acts,
and functions are recited in the claim clearly defining the scope
371
of the invention.
The entire specification is important in the written
372
description evaluation.
The examiner must analyze each
claim and the entire specification, including embodiments,
figures, and sequence listings, in order to determine how the
373
The written
specification describes each claimed feature.
description evaluation requires comparison of the scope of the
claim with the scope of the disclosure from the standpoint of
374
Such an evaluation
one of ordinary skill in the art.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.

See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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necessarily requires a determination of the field of invention
375
and the level of skill in the art. There is generally an inverse
correlation between the level of skill in the art and the
requisite specificity of disclosure needed to satisfy the written
376
description requirement.
After the claims are properly construed and the entire
specification is evaluated, the examiner must determine
whether the application provides sufficient written description
to inform one of ordinary skill in the art that the applicant was
377
in possession of the claimed invention at the time of filing.
Ironically, the guidelines for determining whether the
applicant had possession at the time of filing are more verbose
378
for original claims than for new and amended claims.
B. Original Claims
Possession of original claims may be shown through a
379
variety of mechanisms.
An applicant can show that she had
380
possession by describing an actual reduction to practice.
Detailed drawings or depictions of chemical structure will also
381
demonstrate possession.
“An adequate written description of
the invention may be shown by any description of sufficient,
relevant, identifying characteristics so long as a person skilled
in the art would recognize that the inventor had possession of
382
the claimed invention.” The Guidelines thus proscribe several
mechanisms of satisfying the written description requirement
383
Guidance is also provided for situations
for original claims.
where a claim is drawn to a single species or embodiment and
384
where a claim is drawn to a genus.
For claims drawn to a species, the examiner must
determine if an actual reduction to practice is described in the
385
application. If the application discloses no actual reduction to

375. See id.
376. See id. (“Information which is well known in the art need not be
described in detail in the specification”).
377. See id.
378. Id. at 1105-07.
379. See id. at 1105.
380. See id.
381. See id.
382. Id. (emphasis added).
383. See id.
384. See id. at 1106.
385. See id.
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practice, the examiner should determine if any reduction is
evidenced by drawings or chemical structure such that one of
ordinary skill in the art would know that the applicant had
386
If no actual
possession of the invention at the time of filing.
reduction to practice or reduction to drawings has been
disclosed, the examiner should determine whether the
invention has been disclosed in terms of identifying
characteristics, which demonstrate to one of ordinary skill in
387
the art that the applicant had possession of the invention.
Then, the examiner should determine whether there is a
complete structure of the claimed invention that will satisfy the
written description requirement sufficient to support a species
388
or embodiment. If the complete structure is not disclosed, the
examiner must look to the specification to determine whether
the invention is described in such “full, clear, concise, and exact
terms” as to inform one of ordinary skill in the art that the
389
The relevant factors in
applicant had possession.
determining possession include the following: “the level of skill
and knowledge in the art, partial structure, physical and/or
chemical properties, functional characteristics alone or coupled
with a known or disclosed correlation between structure and
390
function, and the method of making the claimed invention.”
The Guidelines make a distinction between technologies:
In most technologies which are mature, and wherein the knowledge
and level of skill in the art is high, a written description question
should not be raised for original claims even if the specification
discloses only a method of making the invention and the function of
the invention.
In contrast, for inventions in emerging and
unpredictable technologies, or for inventions characterized by factors
not reasonably predictable which are known to one of ordinary skill in
the art, more evidence is required to show possession. For example,
disclosure of only a method of making the invention and the function
may not be sufficient to support a product claim other than a product391
by-process claim.

For claims drawn to a genus, written description may
satisfied through disclosure of a representative number
species, through actual reduction to practice, reduction
drawings, or disclosure of identifying characteristics

386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.

See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).

be
of
to
by
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function, chemical properties, physical properties, or function
392
correlated to structural characteristics.
The representative
number of species needed to adequately describe a genus is
393
One
inversely correlated with the level of skill in the art.
species may support a genus in some arts, but not in
394
“For inventions in an unpredictable art,
biotechnology.
adequate written description of a genus . . . cannot be achieved
395
If an
by disclosing only one species within the genus.”
adequate representative number of species is not disclosed in
the specification, the genus claim will be rejected for lack of
396
written description.
C. New and Amended Claims
Although the examiner has the initial burden to present
evidence or reasons why one of ordinary skill in the art would
not know of the applicant’s possession of the invention, in the
case of amended claims, the applicant must show support in
397
New and
the original claim when making an amendment.
amended claims may satisfy the written description
requirement by expressly, implicitly, or inherently describing
each essential element and limitation in the claim that is
398
If no support exists for
supported by the original disclosure.
the limitation or element, then the new or amended claim will
be rejected under § 112, paragraph 1, and any asserted priority
399
will be denied.
D. Summing up the PTO Written Description Guidelines
The Guidelines cannot be read as a departure from Federal
Circuit case law, as the PTO does not have leeway to do so.
The PTO has promulgated a set of guidelines consistent with
the postmodern written description jurisprudence.
The
Guidelines present a technology neutral perspective on the
application of written description in order to halt the disparate
treatment of biotechnology inventions, or at least to avoid
contributing to it. A realistic assessment of current law reveals
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.

See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 1107.
See id.
See id.
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that the PTO simply cannot avoid the disparate application of
written description to biotechnology inventions just because Eli
400
Lilly demands it.
The major downfall of the Guidelines is
that it is not specific to the biotechnological arts. Biotechnology
is the primary area in which written description law needs
clarification. The technology neutral approach implemented in
the Guidelines is simply a ruse. After reading Eli Lilly, any
applicant could conclude that a method of isolating a DNA
molecule coupled with its function is inadequate.
Also,
inherent characteristics will not be sufficient to support any
DNA molecule.
The application of the written description requirement to
original claims is justified on the basis that CCPA cases such as
Gardner and Wertheim only stood for the proposition that
original claims constituted part of the written description of the
application, rather than holding that original claims
401
This justification
constituted their own written description.
is proper when one compares the underlying functions of the
written description in the modern and postmodern era. In the
modern era, the underlying function of the written description
requirement was simply to ensure that the applicant was justly
entitled to the filing date of the original application. In our
postmodern era, the function of the written description
requirement has changed. A parallel reading of Eli Lilly and
Deuel reveals that the requirement serves to prevent an
applicant from obtaining overbroad patents in the
402
Because the function of written
biotechnology arts.
400. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed.
Cir. 1997) (stating that “[i]n claims to genetic material . . . a generic statement
such as ‘vertebrate insulin cDNA’ or ‘mammalian insulin cDNA,’ without
more, is not an adequate written description of the genus because it does not
distinguish the claimed genus from others, except by function.”). Meanwhile,
in claims to chemical materials, generic formula is specific enough. See id.
401. See Kunin, supra note 348, at 80. (stating that Gardner and Wertheim
do not establish that original claims constitute their own written description,
because Gardner only proposed to address whether original claims constitute
part of the written description). Kunin continues by stating that:
It is now well accepted that a satisfactory description may be in the
claims or any other portion of the originally filed specification.
However, this rationale does not conflict with rejecting original claims
for lack of adequate written description in limited circumstances.
These early opinions did not address the quality or specificity of
particularity that is required in the description, i.e., how much
description is enough.
Kunin, supra note 348, at 80.
402. See Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1566 (indicating that to fulfill the written
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description is implicitly different from that recognized in the
modern cases, the application of the requirement to original
claims is justified. Concededly, the Federal Circuit did not
explicitly maintain this distinction between the modern
function and the postmodern function. However, no other
justification for application to original claims can explain the
departure from the limited application to subsequently filed
claims. Additionally, the application to original claims is
intertwined with the heightened showing needed to satisfy the
requirement. The Guidelines add credence to the contention
that the written description requirement has morphed into a
Vas-Cath affirmed that written
form of enablement.
403
description and enablement were separate legal entities.
The Guidelines also state that the written description
requirement functions to place the public in possession of the
invention. This adds further support for the proposition that
the Federal Circuit has departed from the traditional
possession test articulated in Vas-Cath. In Vas-Cath, the court
stated that written description ensures that one of ordinary
skill in the art would be informed of possession by the inventor
404
Moreover, the Evans court had stated
as of the filing date.
that the function of the written description requirement was to
405
The
place the public in possession of the invention.
possession test changed after the Evans decision due to the
advent of modern peripheral claiming. Claims served to place
the public in possession of the invention. As such, the
requirement was viewed as a timing function after a claim was
required to be added in the specification. The inaccurate
language in the Guidelines, that the requirement serves to
place the public in possession, necessarily raises the inference
that the claims alone do not delineate the metes and bounds of
the claimed invention. If that inference is true, what purpose
do claims serve in the postmodern era? Are claims no more the
meat of the patent application, and do they mean nothing more
than the rest of the specification? Should courts handling
patent infringement suits institute specification construction
hearings rather than claim construction hearings?
description requirement, a patent specification must describe the invention in
detail); see also In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (concluding
that the claims contained inadequate disclosure of the application).
403. See Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
404. See id. at 1563-64.
405. See Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. 356, 400 (1822).
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The strong presumption in the Guidelines that original
406
claims meet the written description requirement is simply
not warranted if the original claim doctrine never operated to
exclude original claims from written description inquiry. No
basis exists for the “strong” presumption in favor of original
407
claims without admitting that the modern written description
era fancied original claims which satisfy the timing function.
The Guidelines evidence that the perceived function of the
408
written description requirement has changed. Aside from the
overall view of the function of the written description
requirement and its application to original claims, the strong
presumption will only benefit inventions arising from the
predictable arts. Hence, original claims in biotechnology patent
applications will still be subject to scrutiny, and most likely will
be rejected for lack of written description.
VI.CONCLUSION
The postmodern trilogy unjustifiably departs from
precedent in order to meet the increasing intellectual
difficulties of biotechnology patents. On the one hand, the
Federal Circuit is concerned with the policy of granting broad
patents in biotechnology. On the other hand, raising the
written description hurdle has caused mutations in the overall
American patent scheme.
The sophisticated obviousness
function simply will not bar biotechnology patents, but a simple
written description requirement will.
This anomaly is
troublesome.
The postmodern written description requirement is
attendant with complex issues. The application of written
description to original claims presents the most puzzling result
of postmodernism that can only be justified by reference to a
change in the requirement’s function. The change in function,
in turn, has caused a shift in the traditional possession test.
The shift in the possession test causes ripples of change in the
sufficiency of the description. In short, the legal issues are
entwined.
406. See Guidelines, supra note 342, at 1105 (stating that there is a “strong
presumption” that the written description is adequate for original claims).
407. See id.
408. The author also contends that the Guidelines depart from the thirty
years of precedent prior to Eli Lilly by applying written description to new and
amended claims. See Guidelines, supra note 342, at 1105 (describing the
written description requirements for new or amended claims).
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Postmodern policy concerns are to blame for the disparate
treatment of biotechnology patent applications. Even under
PTO Guidelines’ technology neutral approach, only
biotechnological inventions are subject to stringent structural
description requirements in the original claims. We stand at a
crossroads in American patent law, because we have the
potential to thwart the progress of the biotechnological arts.
But if the proper basis for rejecting overly broad biotechnology
patent applications, such as the obviousness standard, is
restored to its sophisticated place in American patent law, then
the integrity of the American patent framework can be
maintained. The written description requirement cannot and
should not serve any function other than to guarantee that
subsequently filed claims are entitled to the benefit of the
original application.

